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INTRODUCTION
Any system of laws that purports to assign blame on the basis of
moral responsibility inherently relies upon some view of psychology.
Laws generally reflect the moral sensibilities of a community,
condemning those acts considered evil or damaging to others. In
turn, that assessment of immorality partially springs from an
underlying understanding of psychology. For example, those who
do not "intend" the immoral results of their acts are less morally
culpable than those who do "intend" them. An individual is morally
deserving of social retribution only if she is responsible for her
illegal actions, and the assessment of her responsibility is made by
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referring to the accepted notions of cognition and behavior in her
society.
1
The final layer, underlying a society's notions of cognition and
behavior, is empirical science. Legal mechanics, if moral, reflect the
view of psychology deemed most accurate by progressive brain
research, since otherwise there would be misapplications of blame-
the law would be guided by a morality based on a faulty view of
behavior, leading to punishment of persons not necessarily
deserving of retribution. The veracity of our current psychological
views, however, is actually a monumental assumption; the psycholog-
ical theory motivating our assignments of blame is not an outgrowth
of sober research, but the culmination of thousands of years of
unquestioned supposition. What if the rapid progress of modern
cognitive science2 were to veer away from the psychological theory
upon which we base our morality and our law? If great leaps in
scientific research are connected, in chain-link fashion, to shifts in
morality and then legality, is society willing to go wherever that
research leads us? These questions comprise the backdrop for the
dilemmas contemplated in this Comment.
A defined psychological stance is certainly a prerequisite to
accepting the precepts of our criminal law. Initially we assume that
most individuals are rational, practically reasoning creatures, and
this assumption is the cornerstone of our definition of legal person-
hood. If we did not take this step, it would be impossible to judge
individuals against any kind of behavioral standard, since such a
standard would be undefinable. 3 Based on an assumption of
1 ProfessorJoshua Dressier notes this relationship in his discussion of the insanity
defense. SeeJOSHUA DREssLEP, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 296 (1987).
2 Cognitive science is an umbrella term for disciplines that seek to understand the
human brain. Rebecca Dresser has summed up its components as:
[N]eurosdence-neurophysiology, neurology, neuropsychology, neurobiolo-
gy-[where] the problem is approached from the "bottom up," by studying
how the brain's microstructure and microactivity affect behavior[, and]
cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence, [where] researchers examine
the mind from the "top down," by considering what is already known about
human mental activity and behavior, and then exploring what internal
processes could possibly explain these phenomena.
Rebecca Dresser, Can Law Survive Cognitive Science?, CRIM. JUST. ETHIcs, Winter/
Spring 1991, at 27, 28.
3 See DAvID HODGSON, THE MIND MAT=ERS 184-85 (1991) ("[W]e base our actions
to some extent on our beliefs about the beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. of ourselves
and other people."). An assumption of rationality is also necessary for behavioral
predictions, since "without rationality any behaviour is compatible with any beliefs
and desires." Jerry A. Fodor, Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation, in THE FUTURE
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rationality we establish, via procedures such as trials, the level of
culpability of the person accused of performing a socially unaccept-
able act. We will, for example, punish her severely if she "intention-
ally" performed the action, and less so if she "negligently" per-
formed it.
4
This system of assessment is not specific to the criminal law. It
is merely a legal manifestation of a deeply ingrained view of
psychology. We regularly explain the actions of ourselves and
others by reference to "a network of principles which constitutes a
sort of common-sense theory about how to explain human behav-
ior,"5 and this network constitutes our main "vehicle of ...
interpersonal commerce." 6 We seem to have beliefs and desires
motivating our actions, and we judge the actions of others by
referring to them. If we know X to be a mostly rational7 agent, that
is, a creature whose behavior is systematically caused by, and
explainable in terms of, her beliefs, desires and related proposition-
al attitudes,8 and X decides to walk to the grocery store, we
intuitively explain her behavior in terms of those concepts. We
assert that X is probably hungry, or in extended format, that (1) X
desires food (for whatever motivating reason); (2) believes that food is
available at the grocery store; and so (3) intends to walk to the
grocery store. We further assume that (4) X willed her body to travel
to the store (as opposed to being animated by some external force),
and so that is why we see her walking toward it.
9
OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY 26 (John D. Greenwood ed., 1991).
4 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985).
5 Terence Horgan & James Woodward, Folk Psychology Is Here to Stay, in THE
FuTuRE OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 3, at 149, 149 (John D. Greenwood ed.,
1991).
6 Paul Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes, 78 J.
PHIL. 67, 76 (1981).
7 Upon reflection, few would assert that we are perfectly rational creatures. Some
would assert that we are not mostly rational creatures. See e.g., Fodor, supra note 3,
at 26-27.
8 A "propositional attitude" is simply an attitude toward certain propositions. For
example, "I fear that the sky is falling." Fear is the attitude I have toward the
proposition expressed. The term "propositional attitude" is a convenient way of
referring to the numerous mental states we attribute to human actors. The concept
is explored further in Part III.C.1.
' We regularly employ thousands of generalizations based on our traditional
understanding of mental states. For example, most would agree that if a person eats,
she is hungry; if a person is tired, she cannot concentrate; if a person wants
something, and believes she has the capacity to get it, and has no conflicting desires
or concerns, she will attempt to get that thing. Numerous "rules" such as these allow
us to make sense of our experiences. For further examples, see PAUL M. CHURCH-
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It may be apparent by now that our common-sense explanation
of behavior makes several assumptions. Within the assumption of
rationality, we make the related assumption that there is such an
object as a "belief," "desire," or "intention." There is a definite
implication to our mind-view that humans undergo "mental events"
such as these, and that these events have content: When we state
that X believes there is food in the grocery store, we are implying
that there is some objectively verifiable element or group of
elements inside her skull that roughly corresponds to the proposi-
tion "there is food in grocery stores." Finally, we also assume that
there is a relationship between these mental states and bodily move-
ments, and that the former somehow initiate the latter. Apparently,
our theory of human minds and behaviors not only makes many
assumptions, but presumes a bit of knowledge about neurophysiolo-
gy.
This presumption is interesting, considering that the theory has
been in use for thousands of years.10 There is no definable,
watershed date in history when human beings decided to attribute
rationality to themselves and judge behavior in light of contentful
mental states. The system simply evolved as a foundation of our
social constructs. There is no evidence for its scientific reality, since
it was firmly established before humans possessed any knowledge of
cerebral processes, but this system of explaining behavior does seem
to make a remarkable amount of sense. All of us adhere to its tenets
in our day-to-day lives, and its use is so ingrained that we rarely
contemplate its mechanics.
The above description is a brief sketch of what has been labeled
our "folk psychology."'1 Although entrenched, some have begun
to question folk psychology's scientific currency, noting on one
hand its mostly unquestioned dominance since antiquity, and
pointing to startling advances in neuroscience 2 with the other.
LAND, MATTER & CONSCIOUSNESS 58-59 (1984).10 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nichomachea, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 308,
478 (Richard McKeon ed., 1947) (describingvoluntary acts in traditional psychological
terms).
" See, e.g., John D. Greenwood, Folk Psychology and Scientific Psychology, in THE
FUTURE OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 3, at 1, 5 (defining folk psychology as "a
body of causal-explanatory theoretical references to contentful psychological states
employed bylayfolk and scientific psychologists"). "Folk psychology" seems a vaguely
disparaging phrase, since it implies a lack of theoretical sophistication on the part of
its advocates. It is employed here, with apologies to its proponents, for sake of
Sim licity.?2 See, e.g., NEWSWEEIK, Apr. 20, 1992 (special issue on "Mind and Brain"); Sci.
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Scientific and philosophical restlessness has borne a new school of
thought called eliminative materialism, which denies the accuracy of
our most elemental psychological assumptions, insisting that the
"common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes
a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that
both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually
be displaced ... by completed neuroscience." 13 These thinkers
are "materialists" because they conceive of the mind as a biological
manifestation within the brain, and they are "eliminativists" because
they seek an "elimination" of those psychological phenomena that
rely on the existence of beliefs, desires, and other "mental states."
As neurophysiological explanations of human behavior and
cognition expand, time-worn psychological notions are in danger of
being supplanted by a radically different, but empirically verifiable
scientific substitute. This attack on folk psychology is also an assault
on all institutions that have come to rely on its mechanics, including
the criminal law.
14
This Comment explores the claims and challenges of eliminativ-
ist materialism, and their potentially devastating effect on a legal
system that relies on folk-psychological notions. Part I further
reveals the criminal law's reliance on common-sense notions of
behavior, while Part II briefly notes two brain/mind theories that
have threatened folk psychology in the past and then looks at the
relationship between biological explanations of behavior and the
criminal law. Part III explores eliminative materialist claims about
the falsity of mental state psychology. That section also assesses
folk-psychological accommodations of modern philosophical/
scientific advances and presents an eliminative materialist model of
the brain. It concludes with an illustration of the eliminativist
attack on folk psychology through the findings of Dr. Benjamin
Libet, whose conclusions about the underlying neurophysiological
components of "voluntary acts" may render the modern legal view
of intentional action severely outdated. Part IV presents potential
legal recharacterizations and compromises in response to Libet and
AM., Sept. 1992 (same).
U Churchand, supra note 6, at 67.
14 Psychology influences many areas of the law, but legal reliance on psychological
theory is most obvious in the criminal law, which usually depends on the "mental
state" of an individual to determine her level of culpability for the act committed. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
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eliminativism generally. Finally, Part V considers the ramifications
of accepting or rejecting an eliminative materialist future.
I. FOLK PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
It should not be surprising to learn that the criminal law is
beholden to folk-psychological concepts. Indeed, one might assert
that it could not realistically be based on anything else. 15 The
criminal law's assumptions about the human mind are so funda-
mental that one need not look far to uncover glaring examples.
The mens rea requirement of the prima facie criminal case is the
obvious starting point. Generally, a person is not guilty of an
offense "unless [s]he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or
negligently, as the law may require." 16 Under the Model Penal
Code, a person acts "purposely" when it is her "conscious object,"
or intention, to engage in conduct of a particular nature or to cause
a certain result. 17 She acts "knowingly" if she is "aware" of the
nature or consequences of her action,18 and she is "reckless" if she
"consciously disregards" substantial and unjustifiable risks.19
Finally, she is "negligent" if she creates substantial risks through
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe, 20 meaning a person who has the "normal capacities,
physical and mental, for doing what the law requires."21 We
punish people for negligent conduct in hopes of deterring such
carelessness in the population at large-people will be careful
because they believe they will be punished for damage negligently
caused. 22  These various assessments of mental state greatly
influence the severity of punishment meted out to a particular
actor.23 For example, homicide constitutes murder when per-
formed purposely, knowingly, or so recklessly as to manifest
15 But see infra text accompanying notes 37-52 (discussing Posner's assertion that
mental state psychology is not a required component of the criminal law).
16 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1).
17 See id. § 2.02(2)(a)(i).
18 See id. § 2.02(2)(b)(i).
19 See id. § 2.02(2)(c).
20 See id. § 2.02(2)(d).
21 MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAw & PSYCHIATRY 83 (1984) (quoting HERBERT L. HART,
PUNISHMENT & RESPONSIBILITY 152 (1968)).
22 See MOORE, supra note 21, at 82.
23 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-1 to -2 (Michie 1992) (designating the death
penalty or life imprisonment for those convicted of murder, but only one to 20 years
of imprisonment for those convicted of voluntary manslaughter).
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"extreme indifference to human life." 24 Further, a homicide that
would normally be considered murder but is committed "under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" may be
considered manslaughter, a lesser offense.25 The law is littered
with the mentalistic terms of a folk-psychological framework, and
those terms are a guide to culpability in most crimes.
26
The actus reus requirement27 also betrays a debt to folk
psychology. A "voluntary act"28 is usually required to establish
liability29 for a criminal action, and that very concept is a folk-
psychological artifact. We commonly assert that bodily movement
is achieved through the use of volitions-we "will" our bodies to
move, and thus they move. These volitions are an integral compo-
nent of the essential folk-psychological formula: mental states lead
24 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(l)(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
25 Id. § 210.3 (emphasis added). Note that this qualification of the offense of
homicide cements the law's reliance on folk psychology's concept of intent, just as
mens rea reveals a reliance on beliefs, desires, and rationality. Planning an offense,
as opposed to impulsively committing it or being provoked to commit it, entails an
"ongoing intention" to commit that offense in the future, and so is more culpable.
See Steve Walt, Some Problems of Pragmatic Jurisprudence, 70 TEX. L. REV. 317, 344
(1991) (book review). This continuous intention constrains the formation of other
intentions over time:
To accomplish my plan to pocketJones's watch, I need to deliberate about
how to do so. My plan enters into my deliberations as an input.... The
outcome of deliberation, an intention, is about selecting means to effectuate
the plan. Intentions incompatible with pocketing the watch are excluded.
If a selected means proves infeasible, my plan is frustrated. Alternative
means effectuating my plan will be selected. Treating planning simply as a
series of desires cannot account for the consistency constraint that plans
place on the formation of intentions. Resort to intentions.., is needed.
Id. at 344-45.
26 Mens'rea is not an issue in "absolute liability" offenses, but these violations are
generally malum prohibitum, such as parking violations, as opposed to malum in se. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05. But see United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674 (1975)
(discussing the liability of corporate officers for corporate criminal wrongdoing of
their subordinates of which the officers had no knowledge). Strict liability is narrowly
employed in the criminal law, supported only by public welfare concerns. Most
crimes of moral significance require an assessment of mental state, so that society can
determine if the actor intended the evil she created.
27 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01.
28 Id. § 2.01(1). This term might be considered redundant, since an act will always
involve some kind of volition. See, e.g., OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 45-46
(1881) ("An act.., imports intention .... A spasm is not an act. The contraction
of the muscles must be willed.").
29 There is generally no criminal liability for movements that are not actions. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2). This distinction is "embedded... in our morality, our
law, and our sense of what a self or a person is." MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT & CRIME
(forthcomingJune 1993).
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to intentions, which are executed through volitions.A0 In our
previous example, after X consulted her beliefs and desires, she
developed an intention to walk to the grocery store, and this in turn
became a volition, a willing of her body to move down the street.
A folk psychologist might characterize the volition as a "mediating
state," between "our motivations and our intentions, on the one
hand, and our actions, on the other."31 The criminal law agrees
with this conception, and does not impose punishment for thoughts,
or "mental states," alone. Thoughts must be accompanied by
"voluntary acts" in order to incur liability.3 2
The presence of folk-psychological presuppositions in elemental
legal concepts such as mens rea and actus reus results in folk-
psychological entanglements throughout other facets of the criminal
law. The defenses of necessity33 and duress 34 both require a folk-
psychological viewpoint, and the insanity defense35 exists because
of a legal assumption of rationality in the average actor. Our legal
system has sprouted from an accepted picture of proper, or rational,
conduct, and an individual excusable by insanity presumably does
not see the picture or cannot adhere to its design.
3 6
30 MOORE, supra note 29.
31 id.
52 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1); see also DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 64 ("[T]he
criminal law does not punish persons for thoughts, but only for actions that result
from thoughts.").
33 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(l) ("Conduct which the actor believes to be
necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another isjustifiable [in enumerated
situations].") (emphasis added). This defense thus assumes that there are cerebral
occurrences called "beliefs" that motivate persons to act as they do.
34 See id. § 2.09(1) (allowing an affirmative defense when confronted with "the use
of, or a threat to use, unlawful force ... which a person of reasonablefirmness...
would have been unable to resist") (emphasis added). The only reason to be
"reasonably firm" in the face of lawful force is if onefears for her life or believes that
harm will come to her if she does not perform a certain act.
35 See id. §§ 4.01-.03.
36 Tests for removal from criminal responsibility due to mental condition are
controversial, and there is no universally accepted standard. See DRESSLER, supra note
1, at 289, 296-304; see also Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 1091, 1109-10 (1985) (discussing the relationship between the insanity defense
and a causal theory of excuse).
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An Attempt to Avoid Folk Psychology
The above discussion presents the criminal law as a paradigm of
folk psychology, but this claim has been partially disputed. The
arguments of Judge Richard Posner are worth noting, since they
attempt to demonstrate that the criminal law does not rely on folk-
psychological descriptions. 37 His tact is representative of econom-
ic analyses of the law, but Posner takes the added step of claiming
to eliminate successfully mental state considerations from the
modern criminal law. If true, his assertions would mitigate the
threat of "completed neuroscience," since the fate of the law would
now be somewhat divorced from the fate of common-sense
psychology. Judge Posner argues that, at some level, the law
understands that mental entities such as desires and intentions are
of "dubious ontology," and that the legal system is "much less
mentalistic than legal semantics impl[y]."3 8  In so doing, he
invokes the work of another distinguished jurist, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, to support the notion that as civilizations and their legal
systems mature, criminal responsibility becomes increasingly
"'external,' that is, more a matter of conduct than of intent."3 9
The focal point for assessments of liability shifts from evaluations
of mental state to evaluations of observable conduct, with criminals
eventually likened to "unreasonably dangerous machines."
40
Posner is skeptical of the existence of mental states, or even the
mind,41 and seeks to justify current legal mechanics without
reliance on mentalistic explanations. He does acknowledge that
beliefs, desires, and rationality-"the mental element"-are integral
to the criminal law, but declares that the law does not require a
"concept of mind in which intentions and free will figure."42
Posner equates, by economic analysis, what a person intends to do
with what it is rational for her to do.43 Consequently, legal
descriptions are altered from a mental/internal to a behavioral/
7 See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 161-97 (1990).
38 Id. at 167.
39 Id. at 168. Judge Posner refers to Holmes, supra note 28, citing the diminishing
role of mental states in light of advancing scientific knowledge as a "major theme" of
that work. Id.
40 Id. Posner's use of the word "machine" is evocative of advanced eliminative
materialist pictures of the human brain. See DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS
EXPLAINED 209-10 (1991).
41 See POSNER, supra note 37, at 162.
42 Id. at 176.
43 See id. at 170.
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external account of human action." X can only guess what Y
intends, but she can probably deduce fairly accurately what it would
be rational for Y to do in a given situation. Posner uses the
example of seeking a college education:
[O]ne might begin by suggesting that some people have a "taste"
for obtaining a college education but then show that this taste is
instrumental to a more general goal; call it income maximizing.
The propensity to attend college will now be seen as a function of
the cost of college and of the effect of college in raising one's
lifetime income. Ideally, one could predict whether people would
go to college even if one knew nothing about their thoughts on
the subject; and then one might stop talking, in analytical work at
least, about people "wanting" to go to college or "thinking about"
going to college. People would still have desires and thoughts, but
these would be strictly epiphenomenal.45
Posner is thereby able to remove consideration of mental states
from an explanation of human behavior. Actions, including crimes,
are performed to maximize resources, and are not the result of
particular states of mind.
The cherished concept of free will gets similar treatment.
Posner initially observes that "a person who acts in accordance with
compelling reasons is normally thought to be acting freely."46 Her
deliberation, based on an existing set of beliefs, desires, and
available information, progressively narrows the range of choices
until only one remains. If enough information is available to
eliminate uncertainties concerning consequences, the proper choice
suddenly seems "predetermined," since only one most-rational
alternative can possibly exist.4 7 A subject's beliefs and desires,
combined with objective data about the situation, yield a most-
rational path for her to follow. Free will need not become an issue.
Instead of consciousness being the root of free will, it is now an
agency enabling individuals to collect enough information to
discover an already-determined "best choice." As Posner puts it,
"we have desires, and we have beliefs-formed with the help of
consciousness-about how to fulfill those desires; and the conjunc-
tion of the desires and beliefs determines, without need to posit a
4 See id. at 171 & n.17.
4 Id. at 170-71 (footnote omitted).
46 Id. at 172.
47 See id.
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faculty of free will, our volitional behavior."48 Conscious choice
becomes cost-benefit analysis, as the potential criminal weighs the
costs of arrest and incarceration against the potential benefits to be
conferred by, for example, stolen merchandise. Her beliefs and
desires, weighed against her information and knowledge of legal
realities, are all that determine her conduct.
According to Posner, what progress the criminal law has made
in guiding behavior has come from the steady replacement of folk-
psychological notions with behavioral ones such as those above.
The law is an "instrument of social control,"49 a system of rewards
and punishments that guides a rational, resource-conscious populace
along the path of acceptable behavior. If the known costs of certain
behaviors are high enough, those behaviors are deterred, without
need to refer to mental motivations. If the law were truly designed
with intentions and free will in mind, says Posner, then the
allocation of criminal liability would not stand as it currently does.
For example, under modern law a person who eagerly kills in self-
defense is excused, while the person who would never have killed
but for a harsh upbringing is punished. This distinction makes
sense from a social perspective: punishment would be a useless
deterrent in the first instance, but useful in the second, since
"[s]ociety has no desire to license people who have had a bad
upbringing to kill."50 Similarly, the strict liability aspects of the
law also support the argument that though rationality needs to be
assumed, assessments of intent and free will are not crucial to our
legal mechanics. 5 1 Posner sees two important justifications for
avoiding intent and free will: first, we are unable to "peer into
people's minds" to monitor activity there, and second, even if we
could, we are not quite sure that we would find the mental entities
posited by folk psychology. 52 Thus we are better off adopting the
social/behavioral approach that the law currently follows in many
areas, avoiding the necessity of building the law on shaky mentalistic
grounds.
48 Id. at 173.
49 Id. at 176.
50 Id.
51 For example, an individual who has sexual intercourse with an underage female
whom he believes to be of age is guilty of a crime, despite his intention to have
intercourse with a consenting adult. Id. Also consider the felony-murder rule, in
which an unintended killing during commission of a felony is treated as murder. See
DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 463.
52 See POSNER, supra note 37, at 177.
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
Economic explanations like Posner's are ultimately not enough
to remove the law from the neuroscientific threats that now face
folk psychology. Initially, Posner concedes the necessity of
rationality, beliefs, and desires, because without them actors could
not be deterred by the threat of punishment.53 A potential
criminal is only deterred because she believes she will be punished
if she commits a crime, and she fears that eventuality. This alone
would be enough to render the law vulnerable to the scientific
revisionism proposed by the eliminative materialists. However, even
the propositional attitude of intention is far more important to the
nuts and bolts of the law than Posner asserts. Consider burglary:
the only difference between that offense and criminal trespass might
be the presence of intent in the former.54 The law of criminal
attempt also relies upon intention, where an attempt involves a
legally permissible action coupled with a culpable intention, and
abandoning that intention operates as an affirmative defense to
liability. The desire may remain, but the intention has been
abandoned, and so the distinct element of intention is required. 55
The related concept of free will is also not so easily excised.
While the Model Penal Code considers reflexes or convulsions to be
"acts," they are not deemed "voluntary acts,"56 revealing the need
for some theory of volition above and beyond the economist's
allowance of mental states such as beliefs and desires. For example,
consider Thorn, who is driving home from work and sees Len
crossing the street in front of him. Thorn happens to desire, more
than anything in this world, to run over Len and kill him. Thorn
derives such excitement from savoring fantasies of Len's demise that
53 See supra text accompanying note 49.
5 See Walt, supra note 25, at 341. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1)
(defining burglary) with id. § 221.2(1) (defining criminal trespass).
55 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c); Walt, supra note 25, at 342. Walt notes
that
[i]n principle, abandonment can be found even if the defendant still desires
to perform the prohibited act, so long as a stronger desire (e.g., a character-
altering desire) can induce the defendant to alter his plan .... The best
description of the defense's operation is this: The defendant intended to
perform an action at some later time; the defendant ceased to have that
intention; and, consequently, the action was not performed. Since the
desire but not the intention to commit the offense still remained, intention
is treated as distinct from desire. Thus, in recognizing abandonment as a
defense, the law expresses a commitment to intentions as discreet mental
states.
Id. at 342 (footnote omitted).
56 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(a).
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he begins to shake uncontrollably, sending his vehicle careening
into the unsuspecting Len, who subsequently dies.57 Thom's
beliefs and desires caused Len's death, but Thom did not murder
Len. He will be charged with a lower level of culpability (perhaps
manslaughter) than he would have been had he willfully maneuvered
the car into the poor pedestrian (which would be murder). Legal
responsibility is thus influenced by the volitions, or "free will" of the
actor, and consideration of them cannot be removed from a
description of our criminal law without altering that law.
Posner's theory presents a typical example of the inability to
separate the criminal law from a deeply rooted web of psychological
ingredients. Since the law does not easily escape an identification
with the concepts of folk psychology, one must address the scientific
threats-past, present, and future-to that venerable system of
ordering the world in which we live.
II. THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT
Legal practitioners and scientists do not think the same way.
The former look backward and the latter look forward. While
lawyers attempt to justify their assertions within a framework of
previously decided caselaw,58 researchers seek to introduce new
models in place of the old. There are obvious reasons for this
difference. Certainty and stability are worthy goals for a legal
system, since an unpredictable jurisprudence would have negative
effects on society. In contrast, psychological and biological research
presumably seeks to uncover a more complete picture of the human
condition as it currently exists, and so would stagnate if constrained
by the above considerations.
This philosophical divergence between law and science can
generate tension. Immersed in history and drawing its strength
from gradual elaboration, the law is content to change by preceden-
tial increments, 59 while scientists continually search for re-explana-
57 This is an example of a "deviant causal chain," used by many theorists in
discussions of action and responsibility. See e.g., MOORE, supra note 21, at 67-68, 72.
58 The more established that case law, the better. This is the essential element of
stare decisis. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1991) (defining stare decisis
as a "[d]octrine ... grounded on theory that security and certainty require that
accepted and established legal principle ... be recognized and followed").
More sweeping gestures, such as major legislative reforms and constitutional
amendments, effect more rapid alterations, but these events are rare. We are
concerned here with the dynamics of the common law-the law encountered by
judges, lawyers, and their clients every day.
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tions. In our context, the law has contently stood by its folk-
psychological notions while psychologists, neurophysiologists, and
even philosophers have restlessly sought the empirical underpin-
nings of our cerebral processes. Perhaps a confrontation was just
a matter of time.
A. Sigmund Freud and B.F. Skinner
There have been potential clashes in the past. Any thinker who
has critiqued folk-psychological models and presented a sophisticat-
ed substitute has also impugned the criminal law. To note two
prominent examples from this century, consider Sigmund Freud and
B.F. Skinner. Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis and an enor-
mously influential figure in modern psychology, 60 agreed with
Thomas Hobbes that human beings, when stripped of social
conditioning, are "savage brutes" with the basest of instincts.
61
The only way humans transcended their brutal origins was through
a pattern of internal repressions of socially unacceptable urges that
began in early childhood. Freud was able to explain various
irrational behaviors in his patients by looking to "unconscious"
conflicts between natural instincts and societal demands. These
conflicts, usually originating in childhood and since repressed,
would eventually reassert themselves "through new and devious
channels," thereby causing odd or irrational behavior.62  The
subject would be unaware of these submerged motivations unless
elicited to consciousness by psychoanalysis.
Freud's conclusions imply that one should not be held responsi-
ble for actions caused by suppressed conflicts. The beliefs and
desires motivating those actions are not accessible to the actor,
whose strange, perhaps criminal behavior is now explainable in
terms of unconscious forces. Unavoidable internal struggles have
caused her questionable conduct, and therefore the subject must be
released from any criminal responsibility, since she could not have
exercised the free will necessary for the assignment of moral
60 See HENRY GLErrMAN, BASIc PSYCHOLOGY 290, 302-03 (3d ed. 1992). What
follows is the briefest sketch of Freud's ideas.
61 See id. at 286. Hobbes and Freud differed on the timing of the subjugation of
savage instincts in humanity. Hobbes envisioned a political-social contract agreed to
in the distant past, while Freud looked to individual psychology. For Freud, each
person in every generation had to come to terms with the strictures society placed on
her savage instincts, and this was accomplished through self-induced mental
repressions. See id. at 287.
62 Id. at 287.
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culpability. One need not hypothesize about whether this twist of
our folk psychology 63 has actually affected the criminal law.
Freud's theories of unconscious motivation have fueled many an
insanity defense. For example, in the oft-cited 64 case of Pollard v.
United States,6 5 an apparently rational and accomplished police
officer engaged in a rash of poorly planned bank robberies
approximately two years after the brutal killing of his wife and
daughter by a drunk neighbor. Though Pollard explained his
motivations for robbery in completely rational terms,66 the three
psychiatrists who examined him concluded that he had actually
robbed the banks because of an unconscious desire for societal
retribution.6 7 Pollard apparently felt responsible, on an uncon-
scious level, for the deaths of his wife and daughter, since he was
absent from home at the time of their murder.6 8 In light of the
psychiatrists' testimony, the Sixth Circuit reversed a lower court
conviction 69 of Pollard and absolved him of responsibility for the
robberies. 70 Cases such as Pollard imply that Freud's findings fill
a secure niche within the realm of criminal excuse.
B.F. Skinner, however, had far more radical things to say about
the psychological status quo. Building on the earlier works of Ivan
Pavlov and Edward Thorndike, 71 Skinner did extensive research in
63 In light of Freud's enormous influence, his ideas are arguably an integral part
of the modern folk-psychological view. Many of Freud's assertions have come under
fire from cognitive and psychological theorists. See id. at 297-302.
64 See, e.g., RALPH REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYsTEM 516 (2d ed. 1990); Michael S. Moore, Responsibility and the
Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1639 (1980). Moore discusses Freud's ideas
extensively.
65 282 F.2d 450, mandate clarified, 285 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1960).
66 Pollard, about to marry his second wife, stated that he had decided not to lead
the "financially insecure life" that had characterized his first marriage, and so decided
to rob a bank. Pollard, 282 F.2d at 463.
67 See id. at 454-55 n.2.
68 See id.
69 United States v. Pollard, 171 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Mich. 1959), rev'd, 282 F.2d
450, mandate clarified, 285 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1960).
70 See Pollard, 282 F.2d at 464. For further commentary on Pollard, see REISNER
& SLOBOGIN, supra note 64, at 523-27. Moore also addresses the concept of
unconscious mental states excusing unacceptable behaviors and finds it problematic.
See Moore, supra note 64, at 1641 ("If all conscious mental life is determined by
unconscious mental states, as many psychoanalysts believe, why is everyone not
excused for all of his actions, seemingly the product of his conscious decisions but in
fact [] determined by his unconscious mental states?"). See generally Moore, supra note
36, at 1112-48 (critiquing causalist theories of excuse).
71 See GLErrMAN, supra note 60, at 72-73, 77-79. Pavlov was a major contributor
to the study of classical conditioning, a method of building associations between
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instrumental conditioning, becoming one of the best known
advocates of behaviorism. 72 Behaviorists look only to observable
physical activity for an explanation of human behavior, maintaining
that folk-psychological talk of "mental states" is just so much
unverifiable conjecture. 73 Skinner and other behaviorists sought
to explain all of human behavior as an elaborate causal exchange
between organisms and the environment; behavior was dictated
solely by the response-reward or punishment-that the organism
could expect from his surroundings. Skinner also took issue with
the entire realm of cognitive theory, asserting that behaviorism
could account for all the phenomena that folk psychology purports
to explain, and do so more simply at that.74 Pointing to cognitive
theorists' unfounded suppositions and general lack of verifiable
brain data, Skinner sought to return behaviorism to the mainstream
after it was overshadowed by cognitive explanations of human
action.
75
previously neutral stimuli and desired responses. Pavlov's well-known dogs would
salivate when given food, and they would also salivate when given food accompanied
by the sound of a buzzer (a neutral stimulus). After enough trials Pavlov found that
the dogs would salivate in response to the buzzer alone. Thus, the dogs had
associated a response with a previously meaningless stimulus. See id. at 72.
Thorndike's contribution was to instrumental conditioning, which took the
classical model a step further. The subject was conditioned to perform an
instrumental response-the subject learned to give the response in order to enjoy a
certain effect. Thorndike placed animals in "puzzle boxes," in which the animal was
required to perform a simple task in order to be freed, at which point the creature
would be rewarded with a morsel of food. The trials were repeated until the animal
had mastered, or "learned," the task. See id. at 78.
The difference between classical and instrumental conditioning is important to
note:
In classical conditioning, the animal's behavior is elicited by [a previously
neutral stimulus] .... [I]n instrumental conditioning the organism is much
less at the mercy of the external situation. Its reactions are emitted from
within, as if they were what we ordinarily call voluntary.... [The reactions]
operate on the environment to bring about some change that leads to
reward.
Id. at 79. Instrumental conditioning can also be "aversive'--a common example is
spanking a child for unacceptable conduct, thereby discouraging that behavior with
the threat of punishment. See id. at 85. This rationale is easily applied to the
incarceration of criminals, which is presumably for deterrent as well as retributive
purposes.
72 Behaviorism may be "the single most influential school of psychology in the
English-speaking world." CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 88.
73 See id.
74 See B.F. Skinner, Cognitive Science and Behaviorism, 76 BRrr. J. PSYCHOL. 291,
291, 295 (1985).
75 See id. at 300.
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By removing mental states and the peculiarly human trait of
consciousness from consideration, Skinner dehumanized psycholo-
gy,76 and if his theories had come to dominate popular thinking
the criminal law would have suffered profound alterations.
77
Despite Skinner's assertions, however, it is by no means clear that
cognitive theories are unworkable, and the current scientific focus
betrays a cognitive approach. Skinner actually elucidated a
philosophy as much as a scientific theory-most of his proposals
were not wrong per se,78 but merely ignored the cognitive path
that researchers later chose to follow. Behaviorism was the "hard
science" approach Skinner felt would legitimize the field of
psychology, 79 but it flourished by the good graces of neurophysiol-
ogy's infancy-scientists simply did not know enough about internal
brain functions effectively to replace purely behavioral explanations
of behavior.
Neither Freud nor Skinner caused devastating alterations to our
legal system, although Freud's findings have had some impact. The
ideas of these two men are presented as examples of the potentially
large gap that can exist between progressive psychology and the
legal thinking that is presumably based on an accurate view of that
discipline. Since Freud's views have been assailed on various
grounds, and Skinner's views have been neglected in favor of
cognitive interpretations, it is obvious why the law has had little
difficulty with them. But another reason exists for the shallow
effect on legal concepts: neither psychological view is legitimized
by an intimate knowledge of human biology. Freud presumed no
new knowledge of cerebral processes, and Skinner's thesis was
76 See CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 89.
77 See generally B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971). Skinner
completely redefines personal freedom in behaviorist terms, asserting, for example,
that "[w]anting is not.., a feeling, nor is a feeling the reason a person acts to get
what he wants .... Freedom is a matter of contingencies of reinforcement, not of the
feelings the contingencies generate." Id. at 37-38. In short, human action for Skinner
is determined by the environment, and not beliefs or desires generated sua sponte.
Under this rubric, attributions of moral responsibility are impossible, since all
behavior is caused by external forces, and no free will is involved.
78 Skinner's behaviorism does encounter some problems, however, that make it
a less powerful and less credible explanation of behavior than its cognitive
competitor. For example, it is extremely difficult to explain the phenomenon of
speech generation as a result of environmental factors. A person may construct any
one of hundreds of verbal responses to a given situation or to no situation at all. It
is hard to envision how that behavior could be the direct result of, and only the result
of, environmental stimuli external to the actor's brain.
7 9 See CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 88.
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completely based on observations of external behavior, ignoring
both subjective assessments of mental state and analysis of internal
brain physiology. This is an important distinction when one
considers that the law is prone to following what is called the
"medical" model,80 a view that puts much stock in verifiably
biological explanations of human behavior. This relationship
between law and biology is further explored below.
B. Biology, Behavior, and Blame
In a very general sense, there are several ways of envisioning
human behavior. Besides the "medical," or biological, model, one
might adopt a psychological model which considers one's personali-
ty to be a product of "patterns established during youth through
interactions with one's family or family substitutes."81 There is
also the social model, which relies upon larger social groups such as
friends or schools as the major influences on later behavior,82 and
finally the behavioral model just described, which ignores mental
phenomena and looks only to specific reinforcing or aversive
elements in the subject's environment.
8 3
There are strong reasons to link the criminal law to a biological
approach, which places the origins of motivations and behaviors
within the human body. For one, the biological view pre-dates the
other models and so forms the foundations of the legal view of
personhood. 84 But the biological conception is also the only one
with a completely "endogenous premise":15 behavior is attributed
to elements inside the body, and so assigning blame to individuals
is not problematic. If the law relies on social forces or other
elements external to the actor as causes of her behavior, the notion
of personal moral responsibility becomes far less intuitive: one can
more credibly claim that the locus of blame should be whatever
external operant(s) "forced" the actor's hand, instead of the actor
80 See REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 64, at 327 (quoting Aaron Lazare, Hidden
Conceptual Models in Clinical Psychiatty, 288 NEw ENG. J. MED. 345, 346 (1973)).
Reisner and Slobogin describe the medical model as one in which "one's mental state
results primarily from organic or chemical conditions within the body." Id. They
employ these models as the basis for discussing mental disorders, but their comments
apply equally well to general legal conceptions of behavior.
81 Id.
82 See id. at 328.
83 See id. at 327.
84 See id. at 328.
8 Id.
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herself.86 Finally, the biological view is the only one that is
somewhat verifiable. Instead of being based solely on observation
or interpretation, it is able to point to chemicals, hormones, and
bodily processes as the "answers" to our behavioral questions. It
possesses an air of legitimacy arising from its reliance on empirical
physiological elements. Legal willingness to believe biological
stories as opposed to psychodynamic, behavioral, or social ones
seems to reflect a broader societal acceptance of medical explana-
tions. To most of us, those explanations appear plausible and far
more credible than other, more exotic interpretations.
8 7
The law is thus more likely to entertain excuses based upon
physiological evidence, and the courts continue to hear ingenious
arguments from defense attorneys making use of the latest advances
in genetics and brain science. 88 New information fashions poten-
86 Reisner and Slobogin note: "Endorsement of the behavioral or social models
... could broaden enormously the scope of defenses based on lack of criminal
responsibility, since these models suggest that exogenous factors, such as rewards for
aggressive behavior or the impact of poverty and social class, [account for motivations
and behavior]." Id.
The above concerns arise from a strong determinist philosophy, which would
excuse behaviors attributable to external forces. Those holding a "compatibilist"
position on the question of causation and personal responsibility, however, do not
have a problem reconciling personal responsibility with attributing behavior to
external causes. A compatibilist would readily admit that some behavior might be
caused by forces external to the actor, but that that external causation does not by
itself remove personal responsibility for the behavior. Determinism and compatib-
ilism are explained further infra note 95.
87 Note that courts have not encountered defenses based on behaviorism, for
example. The use of biological explanations is an important element in the power
of eliminative materialism. See supra text accompanying note 13.
88 For example, chromosomal research in the 1960s and 1970s revealed a host of
possible deviations in chromosomal structure that might influence behavior. See
Note, The XYY Chromosome Defense, 57 GEO. L.J. 892, 892-93 (1969). The XYY
chromosomal abnormality "suggested the possibility of exaggerated maleness,
aggressiveness, and violence," and so was claimed as an excuse for violent crimes.
Sarnoff A. Mednick, Introduction: Biological Factors in Crime Causation: The Reactions
of Social Scientists, in THE CAUSES OF CRIME: NEW BIOLOGICAL APPROACHES 1, 1
(SarnoffA. Mednick et al. eds., 1987). These efforts were unsuccessful. See People
v. Tanner, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656 (Ct. App. 1970); Millard v. State, 261 A.2d 227 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1970); People v. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
Hormonal phenomena also have been drafted for legal causes. Premenstrual
syndrome has been presented as a potential excuse for some violent behavior in
women. See Robert M. Carney & Brian D. Williams, Premenstrual Syndrome: A
Criminal Defense, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 253 (1983). Data on the PMS/crime
correlation is still "fraught with serious methodological difficulties," and more
reliability is required before it conclusively may be used in criminal trials. Deborah
W. Denno, Comment, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free
Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 629 (1988).
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tially new excuses, some of which succeed8 9 and most of which fail.
As these opportunities arise in conjunction with medical advances,
the courts sort through them and accept or reject them accordingly.
Whether successful or not, however, these biology-based excuses
do not question the psychological foundations of the criminal law.
These latest efforts at avoiding culpability by referring to biological
conditions all operate within the framework of folk psychology.
They attempt to demonstrate that a certain condition modifies the
defendant's liability because it overcomes her capacities as a
practical reasoner.90 Whatever the particular physiological condi-
tion contributing to the behavior, the traditional legal view of
psychology is left intact-rationality, leading to the existence of
coherent beliefs, desires, and intentions, and expressed via volitions
initiating bodily movements. None of the biology-based excuses
challenge those notions.
But what if a legal willingness to hear biological stories exposed
the law to ideas that did attack venerable folk conceptions? A
theory that (a) completely rejected common-sense psychology, and
(b) relied heavily upon the legitimizing power of hard medical
science would present a formidable challenge to our current system
of laws.
Most recently, the so-called "neurological defense" is being tested as a legal
strategy. Robert Alton Harris, convicted of murder in 1978, was recently executed
by the State of California, despite his claim of "organic brain damage" as the
controlling element of his violent behavior. See Harris v. Vasquez, 943 F.2d 930 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1275 (1992); see also Richard Restak, The Brain on
Trial: Sorry-Anatomy Can't Excuse Murder, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1990, at DI. Restak,
a neurologist, strongly disagrees with "delegating to the neurosciences what are
essentially moral and ethical decisions," and supports the rejection of Harris's
neurological defense. Id. at D4.
89 The law currently recognizes insanity defenses, defenses based on diminished
capacity, and the provocation defense to murder, among others. See DRESSLER, supra
note 1, at 299-304, 325-27, 487. These have been accepted for some time, however,
and all of them rely on cognitive or volitional deficiencies in the defendant.
9o This direct causal relationship is the major stumbling block for biology-based
defenses. It is difficult to prove that a physiological condition was not just an
influence, but some kind of element forcing the subject to perform the particular
crime. It is a purely causal approach. See infra note 95.
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III. ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
"There is nothing more horrible than the murder of a beautiful theory by
a brutal gang of facts. '91
Eliminative materialism presents just such a combination of
revisionism and hard science. Eliminativists attack the most basic
presumptions of common-sense psychology, declaring them an
elaborate fiction waiting to be destroyed by a completed neuroscien-
tific explanation of human behavior. This view also represents an
important intersection of philosophical and scientific evolution. It
is the point at which philosophers have encountered a science
finally sophisticated enough to support or reject their theories of
the mind, and it relies on neurobiological research to back radical
philosophical claims. To appreciate the legal ramifications of
eliminative materialism, it is necessary to understand its origins and
its relation to competing theories that would preserve mental-state
psychology. Cognitive theory has swung from dualism, the view that
the mind and the brain are separate entities, to materialism, the
view that the "mind" is simply the product of complex brain
processes, just in time to derive support from neurophysiological
research that legitimizes the latter conception. Unfortunately, the
most recent child of this philosophical-biological marriage is an
unruly one. Eliminative materialists not only agree with other
materialists that explanations of cognition must derive from the
physical sciences; they insist that an accurate view of those sciences
entails the total elimination of folk-psychological constructs. Where
Freud posited unconscious reasons for conscious beliefs and
desires, 92 where Skinner sought to shift our focus from beliefs and
desires to behaviors, 93 and where neurophysiology provided
potential causal excuses for beliefs, desires, and intentions,
94
eliminativists assert that there are simply no such things as beliefs,
desires, and intentions, or any other mental states, and that we all
operate under profoundly incorrect views of human cognition and
behavior.
95
91 RIcHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 283 (1990)
(quoting La Rochefoucauld).
92 See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
93 See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
95 Note, especially from the viewpoint of legal responsibility, that while eliminative
materialism does imply determinism, the assertion that all behaviors are caused by
biological and/or environmental factors, it does not require hard determinism. A
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A. What Happened to Dualism
Dualism, roughly the conception that the mind is a distinct and
nonphysical entity in relation to the body, plays a major role in our
common psychological parlance, 96 if not in progressive cognitive
theory. We speak loosely of someone's "mind" as if it were an
object separate from any physical (or physiological) moorings.
97
If pressed, however, most of us would not insist that there is a
completely nonphysical mind hovering somewhere about the
physical brain. As science begins to explain the deeper secrets of
hard determinist would assert that since all of our actions are caused by biological
and/or environmental forces that are not under our control, no one justifiably can
be held responsible for actions her body performs, since these actions are not
voluntary in any real sense. The hard determinist philosophy is integral to the
biology-based criminal excuses we noted earlier-since the defendant's actions are
explainable as a series of biological causes, she should be free from responsibility for
them, since biological mechanics are not "freely" chosen or controlled. Denno
supports a form of "degree determinism," in which varying amounts of free will or
determinism exist in relation to any one action. See Denno, supra note 88, at 660,
664. By an assessment of environmental and biological factors influencing the actor
to perform a criminal act, a place can be established for her on a determinism
continuum: if she falls sufficiently high on the scale, her behavior is excused. Moore
has roundly criticized this view. See Moore, supra note 36, at 1115-16 ("It makes sense
to say that we are determined or that we are free, but to speak of being partly
determined or partly free makes as much sense as to speak of being partly pregnant.")
(footnote omitted). Moore himself adopts a compatibilist position, agreeing readily
that "determinism is simply true," in that all actions have biological or environmental
origins and causes, id. at 1113, but insisting that individuals are still personally
responsible for their actions. See MOORE, supra note 21, at 360-61. For example, if
A mentions something to B that prompts B to tell an extremely tasteless joke, A (an
environmental factor) has caused B to tell the joke, but B is still responsible for telling
it.
Eliminative materialists can also adopt this compatibilist stance, thus avoiding
hard determinism. While a hard determinist would maintain that all of our mental
states are physiologically caused, an eliminativist would assert that there just are not
any mental states at all. Eliminativism may eventually become a hard determinist
attack on legal responsibility, but that will depend on where neuroscience takes us;
it is not necessitated by the eliminative philosophy, which admits only that cognition
and behavior are rooted in neurophysiological processes.
96 Ren6 Descartes is the oft-mentioned culprit behind modern dualism.
Convinced that our conscious reasoning abilities could not be explained by reference
to physical matter, he asserted that the activity known as "thinking" involved a
nonspatial material coexistingwith the physical body. See REN DESCARTES, Meditation
II: Of the Nature of the Human Mind; and that it is more easily known than the Body, in
A DIscouRsE ON METHOD AND SELECTED WRrINGS 93, 93-103 (John Veitch trans.,
E.P. Dutton & Co. 1951) (1641). For a detailed description of Descartes's theory of
anatomy, see REN9 DESCARTES, A Discourse on Method, in id., at 1, 35-51.
97 One can find this tendency in various cliches. To wit: "Are you out of your
mind?"
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nature, it becomes increasingly difficult to attribute a phenomenon
to some ethereal, inscrutable ingredient and leave the matter at
that.98 Many of us would willingly accept some sort of physical
explanation for consciousness and most philosophers have rejected
dualism because of its difficulties.9 9 Apart from relying on an
unverifiable premise, dualism encounters certain logical problems,
such as in explanations of physical movement. How does that
ethereal mental force cause your physical actions? Positing mental
causation of physical movement violates the established principle of
conservation of energy.10 0 Since energy is neither created nor
destroyed, but only transferred between forms, a mental state
cannot initiate a physical movement, since that would entail the
creation of physical energy by the nonphysical mind for use by the
physical body.
Dualism still has supporters, 10 1 but their ranks are thinning.
The concept seems to have officially lapsed into obsolescence after
Gilbert Ryle's devastating characterization of Descartes's dualism as
the "dogma of the Ghost in the Machine."
10 2
98 Behaviorism embodied a certain degree of modern frustration with dualist
explanations, and so relied only on observable phenomena. See Dresser, supra note
2, at 31.
99 See, e.g., MARIO BUNGE, THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
APPROACH 5 (1991) ("[D]ualism is not scientifically viable. Hence it is unacceptable
to a science-oriented philosophy."); RODNEY COTrERILL, No GHOST IN THE MACHINE
3 (1989) ("[M]y text goes against dualism and what I feel is too simplistic a view of
the will."); DENNET', supra note 40, at 33, 105-06 (explaining why dualism is in
decline); David K. Lewis, An Argument for the Identity Theory, 63J. PHIL. 17 passim
(1966) (positing a theory that maintains folk-psychological concepts within a
materialist framework).
1oo See Kevin W. Saunders, Voluntay Acts and the Criminal Law: Justifying
Culpability Based on the Existence of Volition, 49 U. Prir. L. REV. 443, 461 (1988)
(presenting the conservation of energy criticism); see also BUNGE, supra note 99, at 16-
21 (presenting a cogent review of the major criticisms of dualism); CHURCHLAND,
supra note 9, at 9-10; DENNETr, supra note 40, at 35-36 (analogizing the logical
incoherencies of dualism to those of "Casper the Friendly Ghost").
101 See, e.g.,John R. Smythies &John Beloff, Preface to THE CASE FOR DUALISM at
vii, vii (John R. Smythies &John Beloff eds., 1989) (arguing that the mind cannot be
analyzed in purely physical terms); GEOFFREY MADELL, MIND AND MATERIALISM 10
(1988) ("I claim that, at the very least, a solution to the mind/body problem must
take account of the weak power of the dualist position."); THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW
FROM NOWHERE 28-32 (1986) ("I am drawn to some kind of dual aspect theory.");
Alan N. Sussman, Reflections on the Chances for a Scientific Dualism, 78 J. PHIL. 95,
passim (1981) (supporting the viability of dualist theory).
102 GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 15-16 (1949).
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
B. The Reality of Neuroscience
When it was stated above that most people, if challenged, would
not defend a purely dualist conception of cognition and behavior,
it was not revealed what view they would support. Our society's
prevailing attitude is actually a materialist one. The most common
modern conception of the brain is of a complex organ containing
the central processing unit for all of our emotions, mental states,
sensory inputs, thoughts, and volitions. That unit is the location in
which "it all comes together,"10 3 for sorting, storage, or action.
There is no such location. The above view is what the philoso-
pher Daniel Dennett calls "Cartesian materialism." 10 4  Descartes
believed that there was a "pineal gland" straddling the two lobes of
the brain, acting as the point of exchange between the physical
brain and the nonphysical mind.10 5 In order for an input, com-
mand or emotion to reach "consciousness," it had to pass through
this gland. 106  The pineal gland does not exist, but Dennett in-
vokes Descartes to describe the widely held view that there must be
some spot in all that grey matter acting as a coordinating force.
10 7
This notion is intuitively powerful. Consider the example of
eyesight: light from the environment travels through the lens of the
eye, into the retina, up the optic nerve, to ... where? To you?
108
To some Central Viewer inside your brain that is peering outward?
Dennett points out that if your optic nerves are severed, you are
unable to see, even though your eyeballs are intact.109 Notice the
103 DENNETT, supra note 40, at 107.
104 Id.
10s See id. at 34.
106 See id. at 105-06.
107 See id. at 107.
108 Those knowledgeable in brain anatomy might respond that the input travels
from retinal ganglion cells to neurons in the lateral geniculate nucleus, and from
there it is mapped onto the primary visual cortex. See, e.g., Carla J. Shatz, The
Developing Brain, SCI. AM., Sept. 1992, at 61, 62. This statement is true, but it does
not account for consciousness. Where is the "seeing" occurring? Where are images
created, and where are they "projected" for your conscious involvement?
Dennett provides numerous thought experiments to highlight our cognitive
illusions. For example, he asks the reader to imagine, in detail, a purple cow, and
then asks several questions about the cow's physical features and the direction it is
currently facing. DENNETT, supra note 40, at 27. Considering that there are no
purple, or cow-shaped, neurons in your skull, it seems as if there must be some sort
of distinct "viewer" of your imaginings, since you "see" the cow. The nature of brain
events, however, makes it obvious that there is no "witness" watching the goings-on,
just as nothing ever "witnesses" the events in your liver or stomach. Id. at 28-29.
109 See DENNETr, supra note 40, at 108.
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"you" in that sentence. One would be hard-pressed to find a
recognizable "you" in all the "neural machinery" 110 of your brain.
There is no internal "screen" on which images are projected, so
where, exactly, does "seeing" occur?11 1
The bald truth is that if you analyze a human brain, you do not
find any central processor,1 12 just as you cannot find recognizable
"beliefs," "desires," or "intentions."' 13 What you do find are 100
billion interlocking neurons,1 14 and no specific area for the
storage of those contentful mental states. In fact, PET115 scans
show that our very ideas are not held in specific sections of the
brain but are fragmented and dispersed among several areas.
116
The process which draws these elements together into a cohesive
"picture" is unknown. 117
One need only skim the most recent literature in neurophysiolo-
gy to glimpse the startling and sweeping changes taking place in that
science. Our knowledge of aging, 118 sensory input,1 19 learn-
110 Id.
"I Dennett employs the powerful metaphor of the "Cartesian Theater" to
elucidate the absurdity of our common views. The Theater is a central "stage" in the
brain, across which all of your sensory inputs, etc., parade for "your" viewing
pleasure. Anything not appearing onstage is not consciously perceived. See id. at 39,
107-13. For a technical account of the visual system and its implications for
consciousness, see Francis Crick & Christof Koch, The Problem of Consciousness, Scl.
AM., Sept. 1992, at 153, 153-59.
112 Researchers have pinpointed regions of the brain that seem to specialize in
certain tasks. For example, the hippocampus is necessary for memory retrieval. See
Sharon Begley et al., Mapping the Brain, NEWSWEEi, Apr. 20, 1992, at 68,68. But this
same research has debunked the notion of a central work station in the brain for
sensory input, language, learning, and other tasks. See id. at 69-70 (describing
research demonstrating that neither hearing, visual learning, nor language skills have
specific locations within the brain).
'1 See infra part III.C.
114 Gerald D. Fischbach, Mind and Brain, Sci. AM., Sept. 1992, at 48, 49.
Fischbach presents an excellent, brief tutorial on the physiology of the brain. See id.
at 50-57.
115 "PET" stands for positron emission tomography. See Begley et al., supra note
112, at 68. These tests monitor brain activity by measuring the use of radioactive
glucose by areas of the brain. See id.
116 This point can actually be used to support a folk-psychological representation
of mind. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
117 Begley et al., supra note 112, at 66. It has been hypothesized that there are
"convergence regions" where data is collected and re-assembled from simultaneous
firings by groups of spatially distributed neurons. See Antonio R. Damasio & Hanna
Damasio, Brain and Language, Sci. AM., Sept. 1992, at 88, 91.
118 See DennisJ. Selkoe, Aging Brain, AgingMind, ScI. AM., Sept. 1992, at 135, 135-
42 (detailing neurophysiological changes in relation to advancing age).
119 See, e.g., Semir Zeki, The Visual Image in Mind and Brain, Sci. AM., Sept. 1992,
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ing,120 and language 121 is constantly being revised in light of
new discoveries. The salient point for our purposes is that these
alterations draw scientists progressively farther away from tradition-
al conceptions. 122 Launched from a materialist presumption, the
expanding neuroscientific picture is fueling the eliminative
materialists' endeavors to redefine psychology with neurophysiology,
thus altering the traditional view of cognition and the social
constructions that depend on it.
123
C. The "Content Problem"
The crucial eliminativist claim arising from the philosophical
and neuroscientific developments above is for the absolute
nonexistence of beliefs, desires, and other mental states. This
assertion is what distinguishes eliminativist philosophy from its
mainstream philosophical cousins. Its underlying argument focuses
on what can be called the "content problem," or the difficulty of
explaining how the mental states of folk psychology can possibly
at 69, 69-76 (describing the history of research in the area of visual sensory systems
and new information gained from studies of visually impaired subjects).
120 See Eric R. Kandel & Robert D. Hawkins, The Biological Basis of Learning and
Individuality, SI. AM., Sept. 1992, at 79, 79-86 (explaining learning processes in
commonly understood chemical and physiological terms); Geoffrey E. Hinton, How
Neural Networks Learn from Experience, ScI. AM., Sept. 1992, at 145, 145-51 (explaining
how researchers use data from artificial neural networks to examine brain functions).
121 See Damasio & Damasio, supra note 117, at 89.
122 An excellent example of this is the fascinating research being done in variable
intelligence. Scientists now believe that intelligence may be a matter of "neural
efficiency." In researching the process of "neural pruning," in which neuron use in
thought processes steadily decreases from age five to the early teens, neurophysiolog-
ists have speculated that intelligence may simply be a matter of cerebral streamlining--
more intelligent people become so because of greater neural pruning in their
formative years. The more intelligent brain may know what brain areas not to use,
thereby increasing efficiency of thought. See Begley et al., supra note 112, at 68-69.
The seeming correlation between genius and madness can now be accounted for by
"hyperpruning-pruning so great as to increase intelligence enormously, while at the
same time affecting basic cognitive systems. See id. at 69. This model is not even
vaguely related to any traditional conception of intelligence.
Researchers have also discovered qualitative differences between the cerebral
processes of men and women. See Doreen Kimura, Sex Differences in the Brain, Sci.
AM., Sept. 1992, at 119, 119-25. If further gender or racially based neurological
differences are discovered, fundamental equal protection doctrines could be
discredited. See e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) ("We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal .... ").
123 See e.g., David Gelman et al., Is theMind an Illusion?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 20, 1992
at 71, 71 ("[T]he advent of new scanning technology, with the promise of actually
'seeing' thoughts in action, has prompted a fresh examination of mind theories.").
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contain content or meaning-how a human brain can internally
possess or represent the proposition "dogs have fur" or "my coat
was expensive." Many philosophers maintain that the concept of
contentful mental states is logically incoherent; the point is not that
neuroscience won't vindicate beliefs and desires, but the stronger
assertion that it can't, because of inherent difficulties with the
concept itself. This argument is a key element in revealing the
precarious stance of folk psychology (and thus its legal manifesta-
tions), and so is considered at some length.
The content problem was once only a philosopher's dilemma,
but the recent emphasis on cognitive science has made it a psychol-
ogist's dilemma as well. Attempts to shift the common perception
of beliefs and desires from a philosophical puzzle to an empirical
theory of the brain has placed more strain on that traditional view
than it was meant to bear.124 If contentful mental states are to
play a role in any credible scientific explanation of the human brain,
certain difficulties, tolerated by philosophers for the sake of
argument, must be resolved by psychologists and physiologists who
adhere to the stricter standards of science. If problems persist as
cognitive science evolves, the criminal law will eventually be faced
with the dilemma as well, since folk psychology has a strong voice
in the dispensation of blame by contemporary law.
1. Propositional Attitudes
A "belief" is more accurately referred to as "the proposition
believed," like the belief that birds can fly.12 5 The same can be
said of other states, such as desires and fears: we fear that [there
will be a nuclear war], or we desire that [class will be cancelled]. All
of these states are referred to as "propositional attitudes," because
each expresses a distinct attitude toward a specific proposition.
26
The problem with relying on believed propositions as the founda-
tion of modern psychology and legal assessments of culpability is
that it is not at all obvious that propositions exist as currently
conceived. We commonly view them as "logically distinct, observer-
independent, language neutral morsels of fact (or fiction)," as
"atoms" used in the construction of our psychological endeav-
124 See DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE 120 (1987).
125 Id. at 119.
126 See CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 63.
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ors. 127 Under present day assumptions, beliefs are, as the term
atom implies, seemingly inscrutable, elemental objects, which
remain completely unanalyzed in psychological circles. 128 A bit
of reflection reveals that folk psychology's claims concerning the
nature of propositional attitudes themselves and their relationship
to human psychological states are not as easily defined and
defended as that theory needs them to be.
Concerning the assumption that propositional attitudes like
beliefs and desires are actual psychological phenomena, consider
the world of Bob the frog.129 As he sits on his lily pad, Bob's
brain is receiving massive amounts of potentially important
information through his sensory receptors. You approach Bob with
a gun. When Bob sees you, he turns to the right and hops frantical-
ly away. Now consider Bob's behaviors and the frog-brain states
that initiated them. Did Bob see you approach and then want to
hop away? Did he believe that you were approaching him directly,
and then turn right and flee because he thought that that was the
best avenue of escape?
The issue is whether Bob (or even other frogs) have mental
states. As Dennett points out, it's not likely that frogs "believe that
whales are mammals" or "could want a pizza."130 Most would say
that frogs do not entertain propositions at all. This presents an
interesting line-drawing problem. If frogs do not have mental
states, do birds? Attribution of folk psychology to sparrows does
seem counterintuitive. We might find attributing propositional
attitudes to dogs a bit more plausible (dogs do appear to dream, for
example, and if they react physically to a dream while asleep, what
could they be reacting to if not a mentally conjured proposition?),
but there would certainly be some debate. As we progress on the
evolutionary scale, why should it suddenly be obvious that human
beings enjoy and employ propositional attitudes? There is no
apparent biological line to be crossed into the "charmed circle"
131
of mental state psychology, and yet we seem to know that of course
humans have beliefs, and many other animals, equally obviously, do
not.
127 DENNETr, supra note 124, at 206.
128 See id.
129 This example is loosely adapted from the works of Dennett, who adapted it
from Stephen Stich, an eliminative materialist. See id. at 106-10.
'30 Id. at 107.
'3' Id. at 110.
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There are stronger points to be made about beliefs as actual
psychological phenomena beyond the circumstantial argument
above. Assume that Bob does have some kind of plausible mental
state, such as the desire to consume food. There is no way to
render the exact content of this desire. When he looks for flies, is
he looking for flies as flies, for small, dark, flying objects emitting
a certain sound, for objects evidencing a certain pattern of move-
ment, or for something less specific or even totally different? No
one knows, but it is useful and efficient to simply say that Bob really
wants a fly. The attribution of mental state is a rough and ready
characterization for an enormously complex neurophysiological
system.1 3 2 If we could monitor every single neurological event in
a live frog, we could predict when and why it sought a fly, and what
it thought it was stalking.13 3 Since we cannot do that in frogs (or
humans), we stick to propositional attitude labels, even though they
are, at best, an extremely distorted description of neurophysiologi-
cal processes and thus psychology.
One might protest the analogy to amphibians by asserting that
humans are the only creatures employing a finely-tuned verbal
language, and so are able to exactly describe, via use of sentences
with lengthy strings of modifiers, exactly what they "believe" at a
given moment. But there is no reason to suppose that language
accurately relates the true nature of a brain state. When we are
asked what we believe, we internally construct a sentence to be
spoken moments later. While this is indisputably one of the best
ways to determine what someone "thinks," it is not "revealing any
psychologically important underlying ... beliefs, ... [it is] just an
artifact of the environmental demand for a particular sort of act
[that is, production of a suitable speech fragment]". 3 4  Like
attributing obviously inaccurate psychology to Bob, we employ
language as a more sophisticated label, but as a label just the same.
We are required to transform complex internal states into verbal
communication, and the result is only as accurate as verbal language
allows. Indeed, there is nothing to show that human belief is
different from frog belief:
In both cases behavior is controlled by a complex internal state
that can be alluded to more or less effectively by the everyday folk
practices of belief attribution and desire attribution. If in one case
132 See id. at 109-10.
133 See id. at 109.
134 Id. at 114.
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it seems that the beliefs are much more finely and precisely
individuated by their contents, this may be because we are
attending not to the "individual beliefs" themselves (there may not
be any such scheme of [neurophysiological] individuation), but to
the products of linguistic behaviors controlled by those complex
internal states, which products are ipso facto as distinct as the
discriminations in that language allow.
13 5
There is no support for the strong assumption that attributions of
belief, desire, etc. parallel actual psychological states. There exist
no facts at all about what frogs or humans "really" believe,1 3 6 and
so language (and folk psychology) become our best approximation.
Focusing on the fundamental nature of propositions themselves
reveals why mental states simply cannot have the propositional
content supposed by common-sense conceptions. Propositions
possess certain characteristics, such as a "truth-value" (if X is true
and Y is false, X and Y must be different propositions), and the
essential nature of delineating some aspect of the world. 137 But
Hilary Putnam's well-known Twin Earth scenario 138 reveals that
psychological states cannot contain set propositions. In Putnam's
thought experiment there is a parallel Earth that is almost an exact
duplicate of our Earth, and on it exists a duplicate of myself and all
other people. The only difference between our Earth and the Twin
Earth is that "lakes, rivers, clouds, . . . [and] living tissues ...
contain not H 20, but XYZ-something chemically different but
indistinguishable in its normally observable macro-properties, from
water, that is to say, H 20."
13 9 Inhabitants of Twin Earth call their
clear, tasteless substance "water," as we do, but it is quite different
from the substance we encounter, XYZ being chemically distinct.
Since my replica and I are physically identical, we are also psycho-
logically identical140 (we think the same about all things, like our
opinions on water), and thus possess the same psychological states.
But where my neurophysiological representations of belief are about
"water," that is, H 20, my replica's representations, though identical,
135 Id. at 115.
136 See id. at 116.
137 See id. at 124-26.
138 The summary here is drawn from Dennett's book. See id. at 127. It originally
appeared in 2 HILARY PUTNAM, MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY 223-27 (1975).
139 DENNETr, supra note 124, at 127.
140 This position is logically required if one operates from a materialist assump-
tion. If there is no ethereal mind and two beings are biologically identical in every
respect, then they must "believe" the same things.
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are not about "water," but about XYZ. We "believe" completely
different propositions-the belief I would express as "water is H 20"
is about water, and is true, while my replica's belief, which looks and
sounds exactly the same, is not about water, but about XYZ, and is
false (to me).
In explaining Putnam's example, a folk psychologist would say
that the beliefs of my replica and myself are just different, that is,
he believes water is XYZ and I believe it is H20. The problem with
this simple explanation is that since the replica and myself are
physical and psychological clones, our psychological (and neuro-
physiological) states are exactly the same, so there is no internal
differentiation to mark the "difference" in "belief." The individua-
tion between XYZ and H20 exists only as empirical phenomena in
the external world, and not in the brain. The actual attributes of an
object, be it water, frogs, or anything else, are real, constant, and
distinct, but the psychological representations of them are indiscern-
ible. That is, one cannot "find" distinct beliefs inside the human
head. The folk psychologist assumes that differing beliefs link up
to differing neurological representations, but Putnam's scenario
implies that this is not the case. Thus, we are forced to conclude
that psychological states cannot possess propositional content. The
attributes of objects, and so the propositions that belong to them,
do not correspond with psychological states, showing that proposi-
tions cannot be "grasped" and "held" internally. 141 The proposi-
tion itself is independent of any psychology, or as Putnam expressed
it, propositional meaning "ain't in the head."
142
A less exotic example might make the case more clearly: If over
a five-year period I believe that New York City contains exactly eight
million people, my psychological state concerning New York City's
population will not change during that time. The supposed
corresponding proposition, however, will change in truth-value
many times during those five years, as the actual population of New
York City fluctuates. Therefore, if my psychological state is one
constant belief, it cannot be a "propositional" attitude, since it does
not change as the truth-value of the proposition changes. 143 It
would be implausible to claim that psychological, behavior-influenc-
ing states are dependent on "causally remote features" 144 such as
141 See DENNET, supra note 124, at 127.
142 2 PUTNAM, supra note 138, at 227 (emphasis omitted).
143 See DENNE-Tr, supra note 124, at 129 n.3.
144 Id. at 129.
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the migration or emigration of persons from a major metropolis.
Those events are not linked to your cerebral processes. The way
folk psychologists want to individuate mental states and objects is by
how they refer to things in the world, but they cannot be in your
head because they are in the world.
We normally think that the way to describe someone's mental
states is to describe that person's propositional attitudes (beliefs and
desires). If we want to build an accurate psychological picture, it
seems we must be able to specify the correct and specific proposi-
tions believed or desired. That is no longer possible. If proposi-
tions cannot be attributed to internal attitudes, folk psychologists
cannot assert that propositional attitudes, or "beliefs," determine
psychological states.
2. Sententialism
But it does seem as though some kind of information storing and
ordering apparatus must be contained in our heads. Even if one
cannot literally grasp a proposition that exists in the external world,
a person must be grasping something concrete, some psychologically
relevant, empirical structure in the brain.1 45  Despite a lack of
verifiable beliefs, it seems there should be neuronal structures
corresponding to what we can only, inadequately, label "thoughts."
Building on this intuition, many folk psychologists propose a
"sentential" attitude theory to replace the propositional one. It
entails mental representations that operate in much the same
manner as language constructs-propositions are represented
internally by arrangements of neuronal "tokens" adhering to an
organic system of syntax.1 46 Combinations of neurons and neuro-
nal structures into limitless mental "sentences" account for the
thoughts a human might entertain and physiologically grounds some
surrogate for the beliefs and desires we want humans to have. The
"meaning" of a mental token is derived from noting its syntactic
relation to other tokens-since every sentence is unique, its
combination of relationships with other sentences will be unique,
and one may thus infer the meaning of a sentence by analyzing how
it is situated in a network of neuronal structures. For example, the
correct linkage of neurons X, Y, and Q might "stand for" the belief
145 See id. at 130.
146 This is sometimes called a "language of thought" hypothesis, and is essentially
the view ofJerry Fodor. See infra note 193.
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that [frogs croak], and looking for this unique combination in
relation to other neuron combinations would reveal this representa-
tion in a person's brain. A compendium of varying neuronal shapes
and relations allows the folk psychologist to maintain some "belief-
like" explanation of psychology and keeps her firmly within the
physiological confines of the human brain.
There are difficulties with sententialism, however, that belie folk
psychology's reliance on that theory. Though flexible and seemingly
plausible, sentential theorists cannot explain some of the assump-
tions and ramifications of their view. For one, the origin of the
brain's syntactic system is not revealed, so we cannot determine how
the brain links neuronal structures into mental sentences.
1 47
Also, how do we know what neuronal shapes "count," as beliefs or
whatever, when analyzing a person's psychology? As Dennett points
out, "[p]sychology is not literary hermeneutics; the 'text' is not
given."148  The strong implication of sententialism is that since
beliefs are represented by mental tokens arranged in a mental
language, we must all possess the same "language of thought" in
order to believe the same thing. 49 Now that the propositional
attitude theory is forsaken, we cannot make the useful assumption
that all persons who "believe" the same thing are just "grasping" a
neutral proposition existing in the real world. Under sententialism,
each person, in order to believe the same thing as someone else,
must have the same exact neuronal components arranged in relation
to each other in exactly the same way. Initially, this does not seem
plausible, and there is no way to dispositively answer the empirical
question of whether all humans construct thought-representations
in exactly the same way. Far from convincingly supported,
sententialism rests on that unrealistic foundation.
There are other difficulties with sententialism. How does the
brain make a syntactic representation out of sensory input? For
example, an impulse is sent to the brain by a sensor in the retina,
and what the sensor "sees" is reduced to an appropriate "shape" in
the brain. What "belief" do we associate with the shape? Suppose
that I am sitting in front of a table, on which is situated a red
object. 150 The mental sentence sent by the retinal sensor might
147 See Daniel C. Dennett, Precis of The Intentional Stance, 11 BEHAVIORAL &
BRAIN Scl. 495, 499 (1988).
148 DENNETr, supra note 124, at 137.
149 Id.
150 This example is drawn from DENNETr, id. at 144-45.
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be "there is a small red spot in the middle of the visual field," or it
might be "there is a tomato on the table," or "ten retinal sensors are
in state G."151 There is no way to ascertain what input the brain
has received by looking only to the "shape" of the neuronal token
created. The only way to determine what the structure "means" is
to consider all of its syntactic relations and powers of combination
with every other neuronal token, eventually parsing out the entire
corpus of a person's neurophysiological make-up in order to specify
one belief-representation. As mentioned before, since the represen-
tation cannot contain a proposition, our only guide to understand-
ing it would be its relationship to everything else.
Finally, some phenomena cannot be "sententialized." Dennett
presents the example of Mike, who "'has a thing about red-
heads.'" 152 He has idiosyncratic, derogatory views of redheads
that influence his attitudes concerning them. This "thing" might be
an actual bit of neurological machinery that is "about" redheads, in
that it will influence the calculus whenever the topic of discussion
is related to redheads, altering the various parameters of the
language of thought so that, for example, positive hypotheses about
redheads are less likely to be accepted in that particular situation.
This "thing" about a certain real object (a redhead) may not be
representable as a proposition ("Mike believes that. . .") no matter
how many qualifiers and conditional clauses are tacked on.
153
Many of our attitudes are influenced by implicit prejudices, and yet
such idiosyncratic "background beliefs" are unquantifiable in the
sententialist's mental language.
This discussion of the content problem is meant to expose the
unanalyzed assumptions on which folk psychology rests. The prin-
ciple methods of explaining the basic concept of belief within folk
psychology, propositional attitude theory, and sentential attitude
theory, are incoherent or implausible. At best they are rationales
for dealing with phenomena that we previously could not explain
otherwise, and it is not at all obvious that the dictates of common
sense psychology are correct, despite their lengthy term in office.
The eliminative materialists' critique of content shifts the "burden
of proof" of accuracy in cognitive descriptions from the eliminativist
challengers to some point in between those thinkers and the
theorists who cherish traditional psychological notions. Still, there
151 Id.
152 Id. at 148.
153 See id.
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are even other aspects of the debate that lend support to the
eliminativists' claim that folk psychology, now robbed of its ability
adequately to explain beliefs and desires, is woefully incorrect.
D. The Argument from History
From a broader angle, any conceptual system that has remained
fundamentally intact for thousands of years must be at least
suspected of obsolescence, and folk psychology's obvious deficien-
cies as an explanatory tool seem to further that suspicion. As one
eliminativist has pointed out:
We do not know what sleep is, or why we have to have it, despite
spending a full third of our lives in that condition .... We do not
understand how learning transforms each of us from a gaping
infant to a cunning adult, or how differences in intelligence are
grounded. We have not the slightest idea how memory works, or
how we manage to retrieve relevant bits of information instantly
from the awesome mass we have stored. 54
Eliminativists remind us of past revisionary propositions that
seemed equally unfounded, but were eventually proven accurate.
Humans have historically been duped by a litany of myths con-
cerning a wide range of natural phenomena, and have been
traditionally stubborn in forsaking closely held, yet erroneous
beliefs. For example, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it
was common knowledge that heat was a weightless substance-
"caloric"-contained in the human body (or other materials) in
varying amounts (therefore, varying degrees of warmth).1 55
Various explanations of nature were built, plausibly, on this
premise. It is now clear that heat is not a substance at all, but the
result of excited molecules. This new conception is much more
successful at explaining phenomena than the old "caloric" concep-
tion, and since that substance has never been discovered, we have
discarded the theory. Similarly, an educated individual before
Copernicus would hardly have doubted that the heavens constituted
a huge, slowly turning sphere, with Polaris as its axis. 15 6 We now
154 CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 45-46. Churchland wrote this passage in 1984,
and science has since made some progress in these areas. See supra notes 118-20.
155 See CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 43-44; STEPHEN F. MASON, A HISTORY OF
THE SCIENCES 486 (1962).
156 A much simpler form of this conception originated with the Babylonians as far
back as 2000 B.C. It was further developed by the Greeks, beginning with Eudoxus
in the fourth century B.C. See MASON, supra note 155, at 18-20, 39-41.
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subscribe to an astronomy based on a profoundly different
framework. The eliminative materialist Paul Churchland notes that,
considering folk psychology in light of the incredibly complex
workings of the brain, "it would be a miracle if we had got that one
right the very first time, when we fell down so badly on all the
others."
157
E. The Argument from Progress
The final argument, akin to the analysis of history above, is a
claim based on the nature of progress. It is best expressed through
an example: Aristotle, an intellectual of eclectic tastes, wrote
extensively on both morality and physics, 158 and his ideas greatly
influenced the western world. Today, however, while Aristotle's
philosophy of morality is still potent, his theory of physics is
antique. This obsolescence is due to the numerous discoveries
made in the physical sciences since Aristotle's time, 159 culminat-
ing in a modern conception of physics that looks nothing like
anything Aristotle claimed. Meanwhile, his moral philosophy faired
better because there are no discoveries to make that can render it
obsolete. There is no empirical component to morality, or stated
differently, there is simply nothing to know. It is not a verifiable
science but a discipline based on opinion, and so it cannot be
proven incorrect. Such a discipline can potentially maintain its
currency for two thousand years.
Aristotle also theorized about psychology, 160 and his psycho-
logical theory, essentially folk psychology, has also not been proven
incorrect, and retains its currency today. The implication here is
157 CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 46. Folk psychology has survived this long
because of the enormous technical sophistication required to effectively explore the
working human brain. See id. The reader should also consider how remote the
chances must be that a complete neurophysiological picture will happen to
correspond to traditional folk-psychological notions. One of the major folk-
psychological theories does argue for this position. See infra notes 166-72 and
accompanying text.
158 See ARISTOTLE, Physica, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 116,
116-383.
159 One can trace this progress from Copernicus throughJoseph Priestly to Neils
Bohr and beyond. See, e.g., Lawrence Bragg, The Atom, in A SHORT HISTORY OF
SCIENCE 118, 122-25 (1959); Herbert Dingle, Copernicus and the Planets, in A SHORT
HISTORY OF SCIENCE, supra, at 18, 18-26; Douglas McKie, The Birth of Modern
Chemisty, in A SHORT HISTORY OF SCIENCE, supra, at 69, 71-77.
160 See ARISTOTLE, De Anima, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at
145, 206-35.
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that if folk psychology represents a verifiable science, there should
have been at least some discoveries during the past two millennia
marking its progress, as there were with every other empirical
science.1 6 1 The fact that folk psychology has retained the same
nebulous quality as obvious intangibles like philosophy and morality
supports the argument that it itself is an intangible-a theory with
no basis in the physical elements of the real world. If a science
admits no progress from ancient Greece to the present day, one
must wonder whether it is a science at all.
An accurate reflection of our true cognitive and behavioral
processes may require a "conceptual revolution" 162 during which
mental state psychology, and thus the law, will be recognized as a
"false and radically misleading conception of the causes of human
behavior and the nature of cognitive activity." 168 But before
finally exploring an eliminative materialist model of consciousness,
one must assess folk-psychological responses to the developments of
science and philosophy outlined above.
F. Can Folk Psychology Accommodate Materialism?
Despite the content problem and the circumstantial weight of
history, folk psychology may not be doomed. In order to salvage
common-sense psychology and the attendant legal apparatuses,
supporters of folk psychology must secure the existence of beliefs,
desires, intentions, and other propositional attitudes within a
materialist framework. This explanation would also have to take
account of the scientific advances mentioned above. If folk
psychologists reject dualism, 164 the dispute then focuses on
various materialist interpretations of scientific developments-the
folk mental state interpretation and the eliminativist interpretation.
As Churchland puts it, "the question of the relation of mental states
to brain states becomes a question of how an old theory (folk
psychology) is going to be related to a new theory (matured
neuroscience) which threatens in some way to displace it."
165
161 See supra note 159; see also CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 43-44 (discussing the
decline of incorrect scientific theories). See generally F. SHERWOOD TAYLOR, SCIENCE
PAST AND PRESENT (1945) (reviewing scientific progress in various fields).
162 CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 45.
163 Id. at 43 (emphasis omitted).
164 This seems to be the current trend. Greenwood notes that "[m]ost ...
defenders of folk psychology endorse the materialist assumption that intentional
psychological phenomena-if they exist at all-are incarnated in the human brain."
Greenwood, supra note 11, at 6.
165 CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 61;see also Lewis, supra note 99, passim (arguing
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Theorists present two major versions of folk psychology that manage
to operate within the confines of the physical brain, and the
continued viability of our present criminal law depends on a
successful defense of these theories from eliminativist criticisms.
1. Identity Theories
This first response to the progressive grounding of cognition in
physical processes is simple, but elegant. Identity theories posit
that, as neuroscientific knowledge increases, we will discover that
our mental-state talk directly corresponds to ("identifies" with)
certain physical states or processes in the human brain. That is,
science will find that "[m]ental states are physical states of the
brain."166 If neurological findings are found to roughly parallel
our folk-psychological framework, then current systems can remain
intact. Identity theorists seek an "intertheoretic reduction": an
instance in which "a new and very powerful theory turns out to
entail a set of propositions and principles that mirror perfectly (or
almost perfectly) the propositions and principles of some older
theory or conceptual framework." 167 The hope is that the old
theory, folk psychology, will be reflected perfectly by the new
theory, a neurophysiological account of cognition. For example, the
mental state of hate will be successfully "reduced" to a neuronal
structure physically present in the brain.
Further, if correct, the identity theory allows for a more accurate
assessment of mental states in criminal defendants. It would be
conceivable to administer a neurological test capable of searching
defendants' memories for bits of residue revealing the nature of an
actor's beliefs and desires at the time of an incident.168 The test
would simply trace the neurochemical fragments corresponding to
certain known mental states.
for a theory relating folk psychology to materialism).
166 CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 26. According to this theory, everyone sharing
a certain belief or desire would have the same neuronal state in their brains. IfA and
B both believe that C is a murderer, then A and B will both possess a similar set of
neuronal connections in their heads that represents the belief that C is a murderer.
See Dresser, supra note 2, at 31.
167 CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 26. Identity theory is also known as "reductive
materialism" since it contemplates a reduction of mental states to material
components. See id.
168 Cf. id. (maintaining that, in the same way that light and sound can be measured
in terms of their component parts, mental states can be anatomized into correspond-
ing, measurable physical states).
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Identity theory may at first appear to rely on a massive coinci-
dence between our folk notions of cognition and the complex
neurophysiological workings of our brains. It does seem unlikely
that mature neuroscience will just happen to reveal physiological
structures coinciding with the mental states we have attributed to
ourselves for thousands of years. But when we consider other
examples of this "reduction" from superficial descriptions to
concrete anatomy, the idea gains credibility. Consider water-a
clear, tasteless fluid of a certain consistency, according to our folk
conception. But water is "actually" x oxygen atoms + 2x hydrogen
atoms. If this were told to an ancient Egyptian, she would be
baffled and incredulous, even though H 2 0 is identical to "wa-
ter."169 A folk psychologist following the identity theory hopes
that mental states like intentions are really identical to correspond-
ing, discoverable neuro-anatomical brain states.
Unfortunately, it is still encumbent upon the identity theorist to
avoid the content-problem previously revealed. 170  Once again,
how can a neuron configuration be the-belief-that-frogs-croak, or the-
desire-to-be-taller? Identity theorists answer this challenge by
avoiding the attribution of content to mental states and subscribing
to a brand of sententialism, portraying beliefs and desires as
inferential states within a greater network of such states. A
sentence, such as "I desire to be taller," is always an interlocking
element of numerous sentences to which that sentence bears
relation. The sentence in question will conflict with some sentenc-
es, such as "I desire to be shorter," and complement others. This
pattern of relations will be unique for every particular sentence, and
so the proposition will fill "a distinct inferential role in a complex
linguistic economy." 171 Viewing the brain as a complex network,
mental states now need only be a particular configuration of
neurons in relation to all other configurations of neurons in order
to possess a certain meaning or proposition. The role played by the
configuration represents its significance and the counterintuitive
concept of inherent "content" can be discarded.
172
169 Other examples are legion. Churchland cites several, e.g., light is identical to
electromagnetic waves, and lightning is a massive release of electrons between douds.
See id.
170 See supra part III.C.
171 CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 3 1. This description of identity theory networks
is derived from Churchland's explanation. See id.
172 The philosopher Donald Davidson has formulated his own alternative version
of the basic identity theory, known as anomalous monism. See Horgan & Woodward,
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But we have seen why this conception does not work,173 and
despite the support it derives from successful reductions in the past,
the identity theory does not seem entirely plausible. It would still
be a coincidence of some magnitude for our relatively crude
common-sense psychology to correspond, state for state, to the
workings of the most complex structure ever encountered by
humanity. 174 Identity theorists are unable to answer eliminativist
criticisms of mental state psychology and their explanation does not
ensure the continuation of folk-psychological systems.17 5 Finally,
reductionist descriptions of the brain as "nothing but an aggregate
of [neurons]" 176  have been labeled extremely simplistic.
1 77
Most materialists today are wary of the reductive proposition, and
prefer either functionalism, discussed below, or eliminaivism.
178
2. Functionalism
This offshoot of the identity theory is far more viable than its
predecessor. Instead of insisting on a consistent set of laws
connecting, one-to-one, particular mental states to particular
neurophysical states, cognitive theorists might claim that a single
mental state corresponds to several possible brain states. For
example, pain is a mental state definable by its function: one might
describe it as an event accompanying structural damage, causing
temporary paralysis, and traumatizing its victim. We could also
supra note 5, at 154. He notes that folk-psychological systems and neurophysiological
systems are distinct, and "operate under 'disparate commitments.'" COLIN McGINN,
THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 170 (1991). Physical processes correspond to a set
of chemical and physical laws, while mental explanations are beholden to a commonly
conceived view of rationality. The two are seemingly irreconcilable, leading Davidson
to assert that a complete understanding of all the intricate workings of the brain
would not be equally revealing of the nature of consciousness and volition. See id.
By this account, the eliminativist mission of exploding the myth of folk-
psychological states within the brain is a nonstarter, since a full neurophysiological
understanding is unable to look anything like a psychological system. Davidson's view
has received much criticism. See, e.g., id. at 170-71 (noting that even if Davidson were
correct, there would be no theoretical obstacle to asserting causal laws between
mental and physical states, as occurs in basic identity theories).
173 See supra part III.C.2. (discussing sententialism).
174 That is, the brain. Even supporters of folk psychology admit that this is not
likel See Horgan & Woodward, supra note 5, at 154.
This is really the crucial criterion for which we search. A theory that could
demonstrate the invalidity of eliminativist materialism would thus protect our legal
systems from massive revision, or at least obsolescence.
176 BUNGE, supra note 99, at 8.
177 See id.
178 See Dresser, supra note 2, at 31-32.
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assert that pain corresponds to certain neurophysical events, but,
since its definition as a folk-psychological state is only functional, a
concrete link to a specific neuronal configuration is not re-
quired. 179 Martians might feel pain as well as humans, but the
Martian variety may have a completely different physiological
representation. Because the definition of pain is functionally-based,
this physiological disparity does not suggest that the mental event
of pain cannot exist. It can easily exist as a consciously felt
phenomenon, but be manifested by numerous different brain
events.
180
Functionalism "is probably the most widely held theory of mind
among contemporary philosophers, cognitive psychologists, and
artificial intelligence researchers,"1 8 1 and it represents the best
hope for salvaging a legal system that relies on mentalistic explana-
tions. The essential difference between functionalists and identity
theorists is the former's assertion that "any physical system-organic
or inorganic-having the same functionally related internal states as
a human being, [has] the same 'mental' states that we do."
1 8 2
Functionalists define mental states by the effect they have on other
mental states and by their effect on the functions of the body and
bodily behavior. 8 3 Since pain can be functionally defined, any
system that can exhibit the required characteristics can feel pain.
Functionalists allow for many possible neurological manifestations
of any one mental event-the functional state of pain is allowed to
be caused by any number of things. Functionalism is thus more
flexible than its relative, the identity theory, which seeks but one
defined neurophysiological correlate for each mental state. Most
functionalists actually agree with identity theorists that neurophysio-
logical research will eventually yield some finite disjunction between
brain states and folk-psychological states, but functionalists find it
179 This avoids the identity theory coincidence. Notice, though, that our
neurological test for mens rea, supra text accompanying note 168, would no longer
work, since mental states would no longer have a singular, consistent neuro-
anatomical label. See Dresser, supra note 2, at 32.
180 It may occur to the reader that any definition of pain is problematic, since
there seem to be so many species of that state. However, the functionalist theory
easily accounts for this: pain is not dependent on a specific neuronal pattern, so
there can be many different configurations corresponding to the many different
varieties of pain humans seem to feel.
181 Dresser, supra note 2, at 32 (footnote omitted).
182 Id.
183 See CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 36.
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
extremely unlikely that the physiological correlates discovered will
match with mental states at a one-to-one ratio.
As with Davidson's proposal,184 functionalism allows for the
folk-psychological notions inherent in the law, since its system of
discussing mental states is divorced from technical neuroanatomical
talk. Definitions of mental events are dependent on their causal
characteristics, so quibblings over physical manifestations are
irrelevant to their continued existence. Indeed, the functionalist
might argue that since mental states are reducible to any number of
neurophysiological phenomena, to "search" for them in the human
brain is pointless.
But the functionalist account is not without difficulties. Since
its definition of mental states is not biologically based, strict func-
tionalism would warrant extending legal personhood to robots and
other systems capable of the same functional representations as
humans.18 5 It is also important to realize that functionalism
suffers a criticism similar to the one leveled against the identity
theory:18 6  There is no reason to believe that mental states,
though functionally explained, are an accurate account of the
"states" we actually experience. For example, Paul Churchland
points out that functionalism would have saved the misguided
pseudoscience of alchemy from replacement by molecular chemistry
if alchemists had simply asserted that the four "fundamental
spirits" 187 of traditional alchemy were easily definable by their
functional states.188 Those spirits were useful in a limited capaci-
ty, allowing alchemists to perform limited physics experiments and
transformations, but still radically misrepresented physical realities.
Since alchemy gave way to the much more useful and powerful
discipline of elemental chemistry, we should reconsider our
stubborn adherence to mental state psychology before shoring it up
with functionalist arguments. We may find new cognitive explana-
tions as much an improvement on old systems as chemistry was over
its forebearer.
Functionalism also gives too vague an account of mental states
to be satisfying. Since functionalism allows psychological theories
184 See supra note 172.
185 See Dresser, supra note 2, at 32.
186 See supra text accompanying note 173.
187 Mercury, sulphur, yellow arsenic, and sal ammoniac.
188 See Churchland, supra note 6, at 78-81.
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to look nothing like verifiable sciences, 189 it does not explain the
nature of mental phenomena, but avoids the need for such explana-
tions.190 In this regard it is similar to behaviorism, which sought
to explain behavior solely through environmental stimuli, while
totally ignoring the issue of mental states.1 9 1 Functionalism then
must also share behaviorism's faults-it does not dispose of the
possibility of a pending neuroscientific revision of our common
sense notions. We have considered the rapid advance of brain sci-
ence,192 and ignoring it in favor of a purely functional account
does not ensure that neuroscientific realities will simply "go away."
193
189 See Dresser, supra note 2, at 32; Fodor, supra note 3, at 30.
190 Functionalism has been described as "a rationale for making do with bad
psychology." Fodor, supra note 3, at 29.
191 See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
192 See supra part III.B.
19s Note that just as functionalism improved upon the identity thesis, Professor
Jerry Fodor has presented an interesting improvement on functionalism, which he
describes as a "species of Functionalist psychology." Fodor, supra note 3, at 31. This
is the "language of thought" theory criticized by Dennett, see supra notes 148-53 and
accompanying text. Fodor begins by asking an often overlooked question: How are
new thoughts generated? See Fodor, supra note 3, at 36-37. If beliefs and desires
correspond to neuronal configurations, then how are new beliefs and desires created?
Fodor finds the answer in the structure of everyday sentences-new sentences are
easily generated by the arrangement of constituent parts, such as words and phrases.
Following this example, beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes must be
built out of "smaller" elements, prompting Fodor to posit the existence of "mental
representations." Id. at 36-44. These representations are "tokens," symbols linked
to constitute representations of propositions. After reducing beliefs and desires to
manipulable tokens, Fodorjumps to computer technology, which cultivates the art of
connecting semantical properties, such as words, phrases, and other symbols, with
causal properties. This is relatively straightforward-a more commonly known term
for the intelligible connection of semantics with causal roles in language is syntax.
Sophisticated computers represent syntax regularly, and by this linkage of mental
representations to computer technology, Fodor is on his way to explaining mental
state psychology within a materialist framework. Mental processes are explained as
causal sequences (sentences, if we analogize to language) of tokens (words and
phrases) that create ideas, beliefs, or desires. Fodor's thesis is more complex than
presented here, but this sketch is adequate for our purposes. For a lengthy
explanation, see JERRY A. FODOR, THE LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT 99-123 (1979).
Fodor is mentioned because his theory of mental state psychology is a slight
improvement on the sententialism discussed earlier, and because it can claim limited
support from cutting-edge neuroscience. As noted earlier, research has demonstrated
that ideas are not contained in one central location of the brain, but are built out of
ingredients drawn from different areas. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying
text. This would seem to support the concept of thoughts constituted by smaller
representations. In addition, certain disorders have revealed the extraordinary
specificity of representation in certain brain areas, further supporting the thesis that
mental states are created by knitting various subordinate representations together.
For example, individuals who sustain damage to the temporal segment of the left
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Eliminativists would assert that neither identity theories nor
functionalism can rely on neuroscientific findings to support their
claims, and so both are in doubt. Identity theories rely on an
improbable psychobiological coincidence, functionalism ignores
consideration of empirical neurological processes, and both are
unable to account for the logical difficulty of attributing content to
brain states. Neither can deny that eliminative materialists are
gaining support for their radical predictions, as neuroscientific
discoveries continue to add fuel to the fires of cognitive revision-
ism. 9 4  The eliminativists' reliance on "maturing" neuroscience
lingual gyrus suffer from color anomia, a disorder which prevents the subject from
attributing names to colors. See Damasio & Damasio, supra note 117, at 90. The
victim can see colors, match colors, and otherwise negotiate different hues
unimpaired, but is completely unable to name them. No other mental or linguistic
deficiencies are present. See id. at 90-91. Similarly, damage to different regions of
the brain will result in distinct, extremely concise deficiencies in language production
or understanding, such as the inability to rhyme, or understand common nouns. See
id. at 93-94. The diffuse nature of language elements and the specificity with which
a particular element can be removed could hint at a rich representational framework
within the brain.
But while Fodor's view has the beginnings of empirical support, it suffers the
same criticisms as sententialism, and the eliminative materialists have suggested
strong reasons to doubt that mental state conceptions are accurate ones. See supra
part III.A. Fodor's explanation has some other problems: first, he is unable to tell
us how the mental tokens are linked together by the brain. He seems to assume some
faculty in the brain that oversees the coherent linking of tokens for use in beliefs and
desires, but there is no direct evidence for the existence of such an instrument.
Where are the "semantic constructions" performed? It would be easy to fall back on
the Cartesian materialist fallacy described earlier. Does Fodor believe in a "central
command" coordinating thought creation? Second, Fodor cannot account for the
qualitative nature that folk-psychological states such as pain or fear seem to possess.
See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text. He can adequately explain their
construction and relation to other states, but cannot explain the sensations that
accompany them, at least not without conceding to an identity theory based on
physiological events. Reference to an identity theory would allow Fodor to link his
representations with physical properties causing physiological changes. Third, Fodor's
view may distinguish too finely between psychological states-two individuals with
even slightly different syntactic networks in their brains presumably could not have
the same beliefs. See Dennett, supra note 147, at 499. Finally, Fodor's view is open
to the same criticisms leveled against functionalism generally, such as Churchland's
alchemy example. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
194 There are those, however, who argue that eliminative materialism is inherently
inconceivable to conscious human beings. Lynne Rudder Baker agrees with the
eliminative materialists that it is simply not possible to assign content to a system of
interlocking neurons. See LYNNE RUDDER BAKER, SAVING BELIEF 86-88 (1987). The
difficulty here, as mentioned earlier, is making"a particular array of molecules stand
for something like the belief that the rifle is loaded." Dresser, supra note 2, at 33.
Baker agrees with Churchland and others that mature neuroscience will not coincide
with folk-psychological systems, see BAKER, supra, at 113, but disagrees with the
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for its support presents stubborn difficulties for folk psycholo-
gists 195 and legal theorists, since both are forced into a slow
retreat as science progresses. The law, being gradual in change,
could suffer a series of accommodations to psychobiological
findings, perhaps finally designing its systems of blame around a
model like the one below.
G. An Eliminative Replacement
So what, ultimately, would the eliminativist picture of con-
sciousness look like? Modern advocates present a challenging case.
Daniel Dennett recently developed a radical new model of brain
processes that severely undermines common-sense notions of
consciousness and personal responsibility. Though not specifically
designed for the eliminativist cause, 196 Dennett's richly detailed
conviction that advancing neuroscience will reveal the "true" nature of our conscious
existence. She seems to assert that purely materialist stories must remain incomplete,
since one cannot dispense with notions of intentionality and belief and still operate
or communicate coherently. See id. at 148. Similarly, she asserts that much of our
neuroscientific research, and research generally, operates on assumptions of
intentionality, since researchers are consciously looking for something, testing
hypotheses, etc., see id. at 171, and therefore mental states such as those are truly
indispensable.
Baker seems to lack imagination. She suggests that "denial of the common-sense
conception may be a kind of cognitive suicide," since it will remove our method of
making reality intelligible. Id. at 148. Put another way, she asserts that language, for
example, "can be meaningful only if it is possible that someone mean something."
Id. at 140. Baker seeks thereby to demonstrate why contentful mental states are
crucial to our lives-we could not do or say anything of significance without them.
But this criticism only highlights our current inability to conceive of the appropriate
answers to our cognitive questions. Baker notes that if concepts of belief and desire
were eradicated, predictions of behavior would become impossible and legal processes
would no longer make sense. See id. at 130-32. These dire prophecies, however, need
not be fulfilled. An inability to conceptualize a new state of affairs is no reason to
declare that new proposals are wrong; Baker would have the eliminative materialists
explain the intricate workings of a new science that has not been completely invented
yet. Her criticisms would have kept humans out of the sky, and yes, out of molecular
chemistry. Admittedly, there is a distinct difference between talk of technological
advances and talk of redefinitions of consciousness, but "inconceivability" is hardly
a sufficient reason to abandon a new scientific exploration.
195 Indeed, the only definitive way to remove the threat to folk psychology is to
find dispositive neurophysiological proof of its accuracy. This is no small task, but
folk psychology does have the advantages of an incumbent, since it is well entrenched
and eliminative materialism is the new challenger. The eliminativists have the
difficulty of "proving a negative." Thus some will stubbornly adhere to common-
sense psychology until it can be shown that such a system does not and cannot exist
anywhere in the brain at all.
196 See generally DENNETr, supra note 40. Dennett does not consider himself an
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proposal 197 fits well with eliminativist endeavors to shake the hold
of antique psychological notions. As noted previously, Dennett first
disposes of the stubborn and insidious fiction of the "Cartesian
Theater" where conscious events are internally "viewed." 198 He
similarly dispels the notion of any cerebral "central command" akin
to Descartes's pineal gland,199 and if modern neuroscience has
fully supported any philosophical claim, it is this one.200 After
excising that conceptual clutter, Dennett fills the gap with a
"Multiple Drafts" theory of consciousness: Instead of there being
a linear, serial progression of thoughts through awareness, there are
only multiple neurophysiological subprocesses operating simulta-
neously, thereby creating numerous "drafts" of consciousness.
201
Most of these drafts remain uncompleted, and so unconscious, but
groups of subsystems will rise to temporarily dominant roles,
20 2
thus jointly creating what we introspectively consider our "aware-
ness" and all of its phenomena. The rapid succession of these
groups in aggregate account for our perception of a unitary self,
though this is actually a mask for the conflicting subsystems beneath.03
eliminative materialist per se, and scorns the use of such labels. See id. at 459. This
is a bit puzzling, since Dennett devotes an entire chapter of another book to
debunking folk-psychological myths about the possibility of "beliefs" and other
propositional attitudes. See DENNETT, supra note 124, at 117-211. Dennett himself
describes the chapter as "a demolitional tour of that philosophical black hole:
propositional attitude psychology." Dennett, supra note 147, at 499.
97 Dennett devotes his entire book to a meticulous account and defense of his
theory. This discussion only touches upon its basic framework.
198 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
200 The most fundamental PET scan would support this assertion, unless you
believe in a nonphysical, irreducible, unscannable mind, thus dooming you to
dualism. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
201 See DENNETT, supra note 40, at 253-54.
202 See id. at 254. Dennett calls these groups of subprocesses "coalitions of
specialists." A helpful metaphor is to consider consciousness the synergistic effect of
a biological "political community" where elements vie for, and temporarily hold,
power. The idea does not seem strange when one considers that without the
Cartesian illusions, an account must be given for what we experience as our "stream
of consciousness," to borrow William James's phrase. Dennett states:
[The brain] performs a sort of internal political miracle: It creates a virtual
captain of the crew, without elevating any one of [the groups of subprocess-
es] to long-term dictatorial power. Who's in charge? First one coalition and
then another, shifting in ways that are not chaotic thanks to good meta-
habits that tend to entrain coherent, purposeful sequences rather than an
interminable helter-skelter power grab.
Id. at 228.
203 As Dennett explains: "[You don't have any personal familiarity with-any
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Some of these neurological subsystems are "hardwired," like the
basic operational protocols of a computer, while others are
implemented much like software programs. 20 4 Hardwired neuro-
nal programs might be reflex systems, while the simultaneous
neuronal subprocesses are different software programs constituting
different "states of mind." Dennett, borrowing from artificial
intelligence research, envisions consciousness as a "virtual machine"
superimposed on organic processes. 20 5 He asserts that the cur-
rently dominant set of subsystems can be envisioned as a currently-
running computer program, in that while a program is running, the
computer will give the illusion of a device designed for a specific
purpose; if one is running a spreadsheet program, the computer will
appear to be a machine solely devoted to creating spreadsheets.
Since this is an illusion, the computer and its program are really a
"virtual" (spreadsheet) machine, and only for the period during
which the program runs.206 Extending the analogy to conscious-
ness, awareness is really a "structured recipe of hundreds of
thousands of instructions that give the [brain] a huge, interlocking
set of habits or dispositions-to-react." 20 7 The conflicting subsys-
tems or "instructions" are partially individualized by environmental
and culture influences,20 8 and as they become dominant, they
present the person's "user interface" with his surroundings-we
interact with others as conscious individuals much as we interact
with the keyboard of a program-running computer.
If this all seems somewhat bizarre, an example might make it
more compelling. Dennett asks us to consider an instance of
'direct access to'-processes happening in a thousand channels at once, even though
that is what is going on in your brain. Your only access ... comes in a sequential
'format' that is strikingly reminiscent of [basic computer] architecture." Id. at 215.
That "sequential format" is what we experience as consciousness.
The assertion that we do not have access to most of our cerebral workings is not
controversial. Humans are hardly conscious of most of the processes occurring in the
brain at any one time. For example, if you have one of several hundred test copies
of this publication, at some point a specially imbedded wire filament will give you a
mild electric shock. If you have an unaltered copy, there is no danger.
Now, if you are particularly credulous, a small organ in your brain called the
amygdala suddenly became extremely active, but you were completely unaware of this
particular organic activity. See Begley et al., supra note 112, at 66 (presenting a
similar experiment).
204 See DENNET-r, supra note 40, at 215-16.
205 Id. at 254.
206 See id. at 215-16.
207 Id. at 216.
208 See id. at 254.
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language generation, in which a person needs to launch an insult at
another.20 9 Dennett notes that our speech acts must develop
from a general strategy to a detailed action, perhaps along a string
of internal directives:
(1) Go on the offensivel
(2) Do something nasty but not too dangerous to him!
(3) Insult him!
(4) Cast aspersions on some aspect of his bodyl
(5) Tell him his feet are too bigl
(6) Say: "Your feet are too big!"
(7) Utter: yer FIT fir ti big1
210
Various neurological subprocesses construct competing drafts of
the imminent utterance, all of which struggle for expression. All
but one will be set aside, as the actor "decides" to say "Your feet are
too big!" instead of the more inflammatory "I'm going to blow your
brains out!" or the somewhat lame "You big meanyl" After the
exchange, the actor certainly considers what other things he might
have said, those utterances we all conceive of but never dare to
express. These are the "rejected drafts" created by other subsystems
in the process.
But if no particular set of systems dominates for long, then who
"decides" what subprocess "wins" the contest for expression, and
which ones "lose"? Dennett's answer: No one. The decision jointly
emerges from the interaction of processes, much like the game of
"question and answer": X asks Y a question, and Y provides one of
two answers (yes or no) based on the structure of X's inquiries. X
is able to ask whatever she wishes, and from the interplay a story
will develop, even though no one party has created it. The process
of speech creation or other intentional action is similar-no one
subsystem need be the author. All of the brain's subsystems
contribute to the cause.
211
We see in Dennett's model the culmination of neuroscientific
advances and eliminativist philosophy. If Dennett's well-considered
predictions on the future of neuroscience result in the above reality,
the legal system will face some serious problems, such as what to
make of neuronal "programs" instead of mens rea. How could the
209 See id. at 234-37.
210 Id. at 234-35.
211 See id. at 101-11, 238-39. This lack of established "self" has serious legal
implications that are explored infra part IV.C.
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law even begin to reflect these changes?2 12 Similarly, the reader
would be right to point out that folk psychologists and eliminative
materialists alike are wallowing in a good amount of conjecture, and
so for an institution as substantial as the criminal law to reflect
changes based on incomplete neuroscientific evidence and some
aggressive philosophizing would be, um... criminal. A complete
revision of the legal institution based on Dennett's model or any
other eliminativist picture may indeed be premature, so a more
concrete and verifiable example of eliminativist concerns will be
considered first. A practical example of neuroscience mucking up
the legal works may help convince the reader that the potential for
large-scale legal dilemmas is very real, and that those dilemmas may
arise very soon.
H. An Illustration: Benjamin Libet and the Delay
of Conscious Intention
To sum up the story thus far, this Comment began by describing
the legal system's reliance on traditional psychological notions, and
revealing the potential gap between modern cognitive theories and
legal conceptions. It then noted the law's willingness to entertain
biology-based explanations of behavior and explored the potent
eliminativist mixture of revisionism and biology-based support.
Although the major folk-psychological theories were not prima facie
failures, they were unable to remove the eliminativist threat to a
legal system reliant on folk psychology, and our foray into cognitive
theory ended with a description of Dennett's cutting-edge vision of
consciousness.
Besides a proposal that we completely discard the current legal
system, it is difficult to make reformative suggestions for the
criminal law based only on the general eliminativist platform. There
is, however, current neuroscientific evidence that seems to require
some legal revision. An assessment of recent research concerning
the "voluntary act" will illustrate the potential difficulties presented
by an eliminative approach to law.
We have seen that the "volitional theory" underlying the law is
actually an essential element of folk psychology,2 13 an element
212 Posed rhetorically here, some options are seriously considered infra part IV.B.
213 To recap: Beliefs and desires develop into intentions, and a volition, or
"willing," of bodily movement is the executory state between the intention and
physical action. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (discussing actus reus).
Note the distinction between "volitions" and "intentions"-you will a bodily
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
that is deeply ingrained. 14 There is no lack of legal theorizing on
this subject, 215 but little of it deals with neuroscientific findings
in relation to the criminal law's voluntary act requirement.
216
This is unfortunate, since some fascinating work has been done in
this area. Recent emphasis on neurophysiology 17 has renewed
interest in research on cerebral processes pursued by Dr. Benjamin
Libet in the late 1970s through 1985.218 Libet's experiments were
fairly straightforward. He instructed his subjects to sit facing a
clock and concentrate on a revolving spot on its face. At random
movement; what you intend to do with it is something else entirely. Obviously,
volitions are not the same as actual acts. If your left arm is paralyzed and you will it
to move, you have exercised a volition, but not an action.
214 Folk psychology does not get more basic than the assertion that human beings
are responsible for their bodily movements. Legal injunctions based on this
assumption are timeless. See, e.g., Exodus 20:13-17 (Ten Commandments). In fact, the
Talmud has an interesting passage on the mens rea/actus reus requirements. See
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Seder Nezikin, Tractate Sanhedrin, 91a-91b (Isidore Epstein
trans., 1935) (relating a parable in which a lame man, directing a blind man, is thus
able to steal some figs); see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 478 (discussing acts in
accordance with opinions).
For a more romantic meditation on the moral significance of personal choice,
see Steinbeck's East of Eden:
The American Standard translation [of the Old Testament] orders men to
triumph over sin .... The King James translation makes a promise in
"Thou shalt," meaning that men will surely triumph over sin. But the
[original] Hebrew word, the word timshel-"Thou mayest-that gives a
choice. It might be the most important word in the world....
.Why, that makes a man great, that gives him stature with the gods,
for in his weakness and his filth and his murder of his brother he has still
the great choice. He can choose his course and fight it through and win.
JOHN STEINBECK, EAST OF EDEN 398 (Penguin Books 1986) (1952).
215 See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 28, at 54; MOORE, supra note 29; GLANVILLE
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 8, 17, 157 (2d ed. 1961); H.L.A. Hart, Acts of Will and
Legal Responsibility, in FREEDOM AND THE WILL 38 (D.F. Pears ed., 1963).
216 Saunders does skirt some cognitive philosophy, but a dualist assumption
underlies his entire proposal on the volition-act connection. See Saunders, supra note
100, at 454. Moore has given a recent and more thorough review of the subject. See
MOORE, supra note 29.2 17 See generally SCI. AM., supra note 12.
218 This Comment makes use of Libet's most recent article on his research. See
Benjamin Libet, Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in
Voluntayy Action, 8 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 529 (1985) [hereinafter Libet, Cerebral
Initiative]. Libet later refines the conclusions reached in that article in response to
peer commentary. See Benjamin Libet, The Timing of a Subjective Experience, 12
BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sl. 183 (1989) [hereinafter Libet, Subjective Experience];
Benjamin Libet, Are the Mental Experiences of Will and Self-Control Significant for the
Performance of a Voluntaty Act?, 10 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 783 (1987) [hereinafter
Libet, Mental Experiences].
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times after the beginning of the test, the subject spontaneously
flexed the fingers or wrist of his right hand, paying close attention
to the spot's position at the onset of the desire or urge to act.
219
Simultaneously, Libet monitored the onset of the cerebral processes
that initiate voluntary acts via electrodes attached to the scalp of the
subject.220 Libet then compared the time of initiation for cere-
bral processes with the time the subject designated as the first
moment he became aware of desiring to act.221 What Libet found
after more than forty trials was that onset of cerebral processes
preceded conscious intentions by almost a third of a second (300
milliseconds). 222 In plain English, Libet found that the brain
initiates action "before there is any ... subjective awareness that
such a decision has taken place."223 It begins movement long
before you are aware of desiring movement.
After digesting this for a moment,224 the implications are, for
most, quite startling. Libet's straightforward finding has stopped us
in our legal tracks, as we are left passively watching the actions our
unconscious neurophysiological processes225  decide to take.
Before insisting that Libet must have performed the experiment
incorrectly, the reader should know that the procedure is not
complex by neuroscientific standards and has been replicated.226
219 See Libet, Cerebral Initiative, supra note 218, at 529-30.
220 See id. These cerebral processes were measured by an electrophysiological
"readiness potential ('RP')," which is a "scalp-recorded slow negative shift in electrical
potential generated by the brain." Id. at 529. These RPs always precede voluntary
bodily movements. See id.
221 See id. at 532.
222 See id. at 529. Within the framework of chemical reactions, 300 milliseconds
is a considerable amount of time.
Also, Libet's experiment targeted "spontaneous" as opposed to "pre-planned"
actions, though Libet sees no reason for there to be a physiological difference
between the two. See id. at 536. Similarly, the distinction would make little difference
for our purposes. For example, a general intention to kill someone must be followed
by specific, "spontaneous" intentions, such as when exactly to raise the rifle, and when
exactly to pull the trigger. Actions involving no pre-planned general intentions, such
as killing in response to provocation or attack, are dealt with infra part IV.B.2.a.
223 Libet, Cerebral Initiative, supra note 218, at 536.
224 1 would advise doing so. Our common psychological notions are deeply
entrenched, and Libet's pronouncement is extremely counterintuitive. The mental
self-discipline required to envision this is on a par with removing Dennett's "Cartesian
Theater." See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
225 Recall the previous assertion that most cerebral processes normally occur
unconsciously. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
226 See, e.g., R. Ngitnen, Brain Physiology and the Unconscious Initiation of
Movements, 8 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN ScL. 549 (1985). Niiitncen even tried to "fool" his
own brain by avidly reading a book and then suddenly acting on a completely
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So much for the neuroscientific difficulties of the criminal law
being mostly "conjecture." 227 Rodney Cotterill has described
Libet's findings as "devastating ... to the dogma of free will,"
2 28
and Libet himself appears to view volitions as epiphenomena: They
themselves do no "causing" of bodily movements, but because of the
unconscious nature of the initiating cerebral processes, they let you
think that they did.229 Our next question glaringly presents itself:
How do we hold individuals legally responsible for their bodily acts
if unconscious processes dictate those bodily acts? Are all those
determinists right, after all?
Libet, after casting us down, raises us up. He explains that we
exercise "veto" power over the volitions initiated by our unconscious
brain activities.230 Once they appear in consciousness, the voli-
tional processes can be permitted to progress unobstructed, or be
consciously prevented from resulting in a motor act. Libet bases
this finding on a detail of his timing trials. He determined that
cerebral initiation of movement begins approximately 550 millisec-
onds before actual movement, and approximately 300 milliseconds
before conscious awareness. This leaves approximately 250
milliseconds between conscious awareness and muscle contrac-
tion.2 31 The actor uses this interval to assess the action about to
spontaneous decision to move about. His brain was not deceived. Initiation of
cerebral processes preceded his unpredictable outbursts by a sizeable period. See id.
at 549. Nitnen points out that consistent monitoring of a subject's readiness
potentials would reveal in advance when the subject was going to "experience an
intention." Id.
Libet's 1985 article is followed by 19 pages of commentary by his colleagues in
the fields of physiology, psychiatry, neuroscience, and philosophy. The commentary
ranges from positive to negative, and deals with various methodological issues beyond
the scope of this paper. None of the criticisms are fatal to Libet's findings, and Libet
himself responds to his critics with a lengthy rebuttal. See Libet, Cerebral Initiative,
supra note 218, at 539-64.
227 See supra text accompanying note 73.
228 COTTERILL, supra note 99, at 261.
229 In his discussion of speech generation, Dennett expresses similar sentiments:
Our actions generally satisfy us; we recognize that they are in the main
coherent, and that they make appropriate, well-timed contributions to our
projects as we understand them. So we ... assume them to be the product
of processes that are reliably sensitive to ends and means. That is, they are
rational, in one sense of that word. But that does not mean they are rational
in a narrower sense: the product of serial reasoning.
DENNE-r, supra note 40, at 252 (citations omitted).
2s0 See Libet, Cerebral Initiative, supra note 218, at 537.
231 See id. ("Such a [veto] role is feasible since conscious intention is reported to
appear about 150 to 200 ms before the beginning of muscle activation ... even
though it occurs several hundred ms later than the cerebral initiating processes.").
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be performed and then to allow or stop it. Based on this finding,
Libet claims that notions of free will and individual responsibility
need not be rejected, just revised: "Processes associated with
individual responsibility and free will. . . 'operate' not to initiate a
voluntary act but to select and control volitional outcomes."
23 2
But Libet's empirical evidence for this assertion is not as strong as
that supporting his original delay-of-consciousness finding, partly
because present technology is not up to the task.2 33 The veto
phenomenon also creates certain neuro-philosophical difficulties,
since Libet is left presenting a dualist design for the brain.
23 4
Several commentators have noted this, and since dualism appears
to be all but defunct, Libet's attempt to save the concept of
individual responsibility may not succeed. Arthur Danto accuses
Libet of being "in the grip of a kind of metaphysical hysteria,"
finding it incoherent that Libet would "at the end of his paper...
postulate functions [the veto power] whose existence would be
incompatible with everything he had up to that point been at pains
to show."235 Indeed, Libet balks, much as Dennett does, when he
The concept of a veto function is apparently not controversial. See Eckart Scheerer,
Conscious Intention is a Mental Fiat, 8 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCI. 552, 553 (1985)
(noting the discovery of a conscious veto phenomenon, or "flashlike counter-
command," as early as 1935).
232 Libet, Cerebral Initiative, supra note 218, at 538. In a legal context, this less
significant role for intention would lead to some changes. See infra notes 285-309 and
accompanying text.
233 See Libet, Cerebral Initiative, supra note 218, at 538 ("[T]here is presently no
technique available for recording and analyzing any RPs that may be associated with
... spontaneous, irregularly appearing conscious urges to act that do not lead to an
actual motor event."). Libet does present some support for the veto proposal, see id.,
as does Scheerer's findings, see Scheerer, supra note 231, at 553.
234 Despite Scheerer's work, supra note 231, Libet's assertion of a conscious veto
power has drawn strong criticism. The presence of unconscious cerebral forces and
a conscious veto power combine to create the interesting implication that Libet is a
dualist. Though he denies espousing a stance on the mind-brain problem, see Libet,
MentalExperiences, supra note 218, at 784, Libet appears logically cornered: urges are
unconsciously, neurophsyiologically caused, and yet Libet poses no such origins for
the "veto" power. This has even been called "double dualism"-one kind of mental
event, the intention, emerges from neurophysiological processes and is thus a product
of interactionist dualism, and another mental event, the veto power, is completely
nonphysically based, and is thus the product of classic Cartesian dualism. See R.J.
Nelson, Libet's Dualism, 8 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN ScI. 550, 550 (1985); see also Charles
C. Wood, Pardon, Your Dualism is Showing, 8 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sc:. 557, 557
(1985) (insisting on Libet's dualism and recasting Libet's findings into a materialist
framework). Both of these authors wield dualism as an accusation-further evidence
of dualism's widespread rejection in cognitive and philosophical circles. See supra text
accompanying note 102.
235 Arthur C. Danto, Consciousness and Motor Control, 8 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN ScI.
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stumbles upon what might be the inevitable truth of eliminativism.
Just as Dennett, after expostulating a sweeping neo-cognitive
picture, attempts to save the concept of rationality and responsibili-
ty with his "intentional stance,"25 6 Libet declares his conclusions
and then scrambles to save us from determinism with the conscious
"veto power." In truth, both Dennett and Libet have landed
squarely in Churchland's lap-supporting the cause for a complete
rejection of mental state psychology. In fact, far from requiring
accusations of dualism, Libet actually provides further support for
Dennett's model of consciousness, and thus for eliminative
materialism.
Libet's conclusions concerning the delay of awareness of
intention need not be startling. The difficulties of Danto,
23 7
Nelson,23 8 Wood,23 9 and others who cannot reconcile Libet
with their view of reality all stem from the most stubborn of folk-
psychological myths: the myth of the unitary mind. This Comment
has twice mentioned the pitfalls of Cartesian materialism,240 and
once again it has arisen to confuse us. Those still beguiled (despite
several warnings) surely protested Libet on the grounds that the
elusive "you" simply must command your own volitions, and not the
other way around! But if we embrace a Dennett-like vision of the
brain,241 not only do Libet's findings make sense,242 it is diffi-
cult to envision how else intentionality might operate. Eliminate
Descartes's apocryphal "command center," and we are left with a
complex machine: the initiation of a potential motor act is begun
by coalitions of competing subsystems, representing various action
alternatives, and influenced by other subsystems (like sensory input).
Within a Dennett-like scheme, conscious willings are the effect of
the coalition of neurological subsystems that comes temporarily to
dominate the brain. As one of the competing subsystem groupings
540, 541 (1985). Danto himself does not dispute Libet's findings, content to agree
that 'consciousness simply assures us we are in contact with ourselves." Id.
236 This is discussed infra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
237 See Danto, supra note 235.
238 See Nelson, supra note 234.
239 See Wood, supra note 234.
240 See supra notes 104-23 and accompanying text.
241 The reader might find a quick review of part III.G helpful at this point.
242 Dennett briefly mentions Libet's experiment, and rejects Libet's conclusion
that unconscious intentions "present themselves" to consciousness (in the Cartesian
Theater?) and then are acted upon if not vetoed. See DENNETr, supra note 40, at 165.
However, his alternative interpretation of Libet's data is less empirically supportable
than Libet's own thesis. See id. at 164.
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emerges, a course of action is "chosen"24-subsystems interact,
rejecting some drafts and keeping another. The "winning" course
of action then "comes to consciousness" as that team of subsystems
gains dominant status. Libet's measurements of cerebral activity
preceding "subjective awareness" are thus accounted for by the
underlying neurological subsystem competition, and what Libet calls
the "veto" phenomenon is nothing more than the "awareness" that
arises with the winner.
IV. ELIMINATwE MATERIALISM, NEUROSCIENCE
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
A specific and plausible view of eliminative materialist claims has
finally been built. Eliminativists' views are now not as wildly
extreme as once suspected, and those views are supported by
empirical findings unexplainable by common-sense psychology.
Now, since advocating abject surrender to hard determinism and
scrapping the legal system is not, and never was, helpful,2 44 one
must explore some possible legal responses to the fall of folk
psychology and the findings of Libet. Part A will pursue the
theoretical issue of how to rationalize assignments of blame without
reference to folk-psychological theories, and Part B will suggest less
drastic alterations of the current criminal justice system that might
begin to accommodate Dennett's new model of consciousness and
the findings of Libet. This Comment will then close with an
exploration of the final theoretical obstacle to a post-folk-psychology
legal framework and make some predictions about the future of
criminal law as neuroscience continues to develop.
243 See the "question and answer" element of Dennett's model of consciousness,
supra text accompanying note 211.
244 Dennett would certainly not dispute that there is a "mechanistic" explanation
for all of human behavior, but he does believe we are incapable of consciously
adopting determinism. See Daniel C. Dennett, Mechanism and Responsibility, in ESSAYS
ON FREEDOM OF ACTION 157, 181 (Ted Honderich ed., 1973). The problem is
highlighted by a commentator quoted by Dennett: "'The motto of the mechanist
ought to be: One cannot speak, therefore one must be silent.'" Id. (quoting N.
Malcom).
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A. Eliminative Materialism and Criminal Responsibility
There are several methods of reconciling the nonexistence of
mental states and volitions with legal responsibility for individual
behavior, but all of them require some degree of "cheating"-these
methods either create a fiction on which to base responsibility (what
lawyers would surely call "constructive" moral responsibility), or
circumvent the difficulties presented by Libet and the eliminative
materialists by changing the accepted description or rationale of the
criminal law. Each approach is discussed in turn.
1. Fictionalizing Intentionality
As is by now obvious, the philosopher Daniel Dennett is no
friend to folk-psychological constructs. Interestingly though,
Dennett does not trumpet the cause for scrapping mental state
psychology. After demolishing common-sensical notions of belief
and proposing radical new hypotheses of brain function, Dennett
retreats from the obvious implications of his theories to an
instrumentalist position: he proposes that we maintain our current
system of predicting behavior via reference to propositional
attitudes, even though we now know it to be an inaccurate picture
of cognition and behavior. This concession would allow us to
preserve an easy method of assessing rationality, making behavioral
predictions, and assigning responsibility for individual actions.
245
Dennett envisions reformulating the folk psychology fiction into
three "stances" from which to judge behavior: the physical stance,
the design stance, and the intentional stance. 246 Prediction from
the physical stance involves reference to physical laws, such as
"when enough water is poured into a cup, it will begin to flow over
245 See id. at 164-65. Dennett has compiled a book of his essays defending this
position. See DENNETr, supra note 124. For a cogent summary of his main
arguments, see Dennett, supra note 147, passim.
Dennett has drawn criticism from all quarters for his compromising nature;
Baker devotes an entire chapter to criticizing Dennett's instrumentalist position. See,
e.g., BAKER, supra note 194, at 149-66 (insisting that Dennett cannot maintain a
materialist view if he asserts that intentional systems are a necessity); see also Paul M.
Churchland, Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior, in THE FUTURE OF
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 3, at 51, 65-67 (describing Dennett's intentional stance
theory as "arbitrary protectionism" of folk psychology and likening Dennett to a
deceptive Monty Python character); Horgan & Woodward, supra note 5, at 151
(criticizing Dennett for using folk-psychological systems but not accepting their
veracity).
246 See Dennett, supra note 244, at 163-64.
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the sides, because the physical laws of gravity will make it do so."
The design stance predicts behavior by referring to the mechanical
nature of an object, such as "when this cursor reaches the right-
hand margin, the word processor will automatically transfer it to the
left-hand margin on the next line, because the program is designed
that way." Finally, there is the intentional stance, which predicts
behavior based on a subjective conception of rationality, such as
"when a chess computer is faced with situation X, it will move its
king one space to its right because, to me, that would be the best
strategic move." We predict the moves of the computer by referring
to what a reasonable move would be (to us), since the program,
while "designed," is too complex for a human to grasp and predict
from the design stance.2 47 Since we cannot base our prediction
on internal workings, the best way to guess is by reference to what
we would do in the same situation. Human actions can be interpret-
ed in the same way: we predict the behaviors of others by referring
to what we envision as rational behavior, since the human being is
a machine too complex for us to make accurate predictions of its
behavior on the basis of our current neuroscientific knowledge.
This intentional system operates regardless of whether the object in
question actually has beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth.2 48
It is a purely practically and observationally based tool.
The use of Dennett's scheme as a fictionalized account of human
behavior clarifies the position of certain groups in relation to the
rest of society. Consider the insane: since they are not "rational,"
society (and the law) should treat them from a design stance2 49 if
enough is known of their mental disorder effectively to do so. If
the neurological "design" of the insanity is known, that knowledge
can be used to predict or perhaps guide the insane person's
behavior, without reference to any mental state language. Similarly,
to manipulate another's behavior with the use of drugs would be to
treat her from the physical stance, since drugs interfere with specific
and physiologically set processes. No reference to mental states is
required in that instance either.
247 See id. at 164.
248 See id.
249 See id. at 165. The idea here is to predict from the stance most useful in a
particular situation. We attempt to predict the behavior of the mentally ill person
from the design stance because her illness stems from a defect in her neurophysiolog-
ical mechanics, or design.
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Dennett's fiction saves the criminal law numerous contortions.
It allows that for purposes of assigning blame, society is simply
employing a fictional model of humans as beings that entertain
propositional attitudes and perform intentional acts. We employ
this model of rationality because it is more easily grasped than the
actual complex workings of the human "machine," not because we
genuinely believe that humans have such attitudes and inten-
tions.250 Since most humans operate within Dennett's intentional
system, that is, they are rational, Dennett's instrumentalism allows
the criminal law to remain practically untouched, since it rests on
similar presumptions. One could set varying degrees of blame
based on whichever "stance" dictated the actor's behavior. The
physical stance would imply that the individual's actions were
compelled biologically, as with drugs, and that she is therefore not
responsible for them. The design stance would imply that the
actor's actions were caused by the manipulations of another, such
as in situations of necessity or duress, or were the result of
submerged neurophysiological processes, such as the efficiency
protocol discussed below. 251 Finally, the intentional stance would
apply to the standard legal person-the mostly practical reasoners at
whom the law is aimed.
Adoption of Dennett's or a similar intentional fiction is
tantamount to conceding defeat in the effort to shape legal
responsibility around a biological science that is leading in a
direction society did not foresee. Dennett asserts that the inten-
tional stance is vital to living in the real world, even though it
mimics incorrect psychological assumptions. 25 2 This may or may
not be so, but regardless of that claim, this position in the criminal
law amounts to purposeful ignorance of scientific change. Under
such a scenario the law is maintaining its own view of human
behavior while scientists fill in an increasingly different reality.
Professor Moore notes that legal theorists today are prone to accept
"as if" views like those of Dennett, but Moore himself is not willing
to accept this gap between scientific reality and assignments of
blame:
250 Note that this system leaves the door open to legal personhood for artificial
intelligences.
251 See infra notes 296-304 and accompanying text.
252 See DENNETr, supra note 124, at 108. As Dennett points out, "Try catching
frogs without it." Id.
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[Lawyers] are apt to be apologetic in the face of deterministic
science ..... To justify our criminal laws, lawyers talk of positing
free human actions, even though they admit that scientifically
there is no such freedom.
This kind of reconciliation by fiat cannot possibly work. The
law demands more than that we pretend people are free and thus
hold them responsible as if they were. Ajust legal system requires
people to be truly responsible.
253
Like alchemy, the law may be rendered obsolete by the superior, if
nascent, successor of scientific discovery.
2. Redescribing the Law
In contrast to fictionalizing intentionality, recharacterizing the
law to avoid reliance on mental state assessments allows us to avoid
accusations of stubborn intransigence in the face of progressive
science. Moreover, through reappraisals of long-standing legal
doctrines, we might be able to maintain much of the current legal
system. Professor Kevin Saunders, for example, has concocted an
ingenious method of avoiding the old mind-body problem in
questions of volition and the criminal law. His proposal is not
directly applicable to our endeavor because the problem he
identifies only exists if one espouses dualism; nevertheless, his
method of redefinition is a good model for changes we might make.
Encountering unsolvable philosophical/scientific difficulties in
attempting to show that nonphysical mind states are the cause of
physical actions,2 54 Saunders completely avoids the problem by
describing the mind as an entity that "solicits" the body. According
to Saunders, even if the nonphysical mind cannot directly cause
physical acts, it can be held culpable for attempting to solicit the
body to perform criminal actions. The Model Penal Code can be
read to support Saunders's proposal:
(1) Definition of Solicitation. A person is guilty of solicitation to
commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its
commission he commands, encourages or requests another person to
253 Moore, supra note 36, at 1121-22.
254 See Saunders, supra note 100, at 467. The problem of the Law of Conservation
of Energy is a good example. Seesupra note 100 and accompanying text. Materialists
avoid this problem because for them there is no separate mind and brain: the "mind"
is a biological manifestation, not a spiritual one. The phenomenon of physical
processes causing other physical processes is obviously not problematic.
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engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime or
an attempt to commit such crime or which would establish his
complicity in its commission or attempted commission.
2 55
Thus, if we view the mind as merely in contact with the body,
minds, and therefore people, can be held liable for physical acts,
since the culpable mental state need only command or request
action, not actually cause it.
256
Saunders's idea is clever, but our task is far more daunting. We
must fashion a systemic legal redescription which completely
removes the criminal law's manifestations of mental state psychology
while avoiding a major upheaval. Two existing legal theories
attempt to perform this trick: the "character" theory of responsibili-
ty and economics-based theories of human behavior. None are
entirely successful, but they may guide the way for more sophisticat-
ed attempts at reconciling eliminative materialism and our legal
necessities.
a. The Character Theory of Responsibility
"[Y]ou are being condemned, Robespierre is told, 'because you lack
grace. ,2
57
The character theory is generally credited to David Hume, who
once stated that "actions are objects of our moral sentiment so far
only as they are indications of the internal character."258 Under
the related legal view, an actor can only be held responsible for her
acts if those acts are expressive of her underlying character.
Personal character becomes the primary focus of responsibility, and
the behaviors an actor exhibits are considered proxies for that
character, since they are the only observable indications of the kind
of character a person possesses. 259  While the character theory
255 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(1), quoted in Saunders, supra note 100, at 469
(em bases added by Saunders).
See Saunders, supra note 100, at 469-75.
27 Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring
1990, at 29, 55.
258 DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 108 (Charles
W. Hendel ed., The Liberal Arts Press 1955) (1748).
259 See Moore, supra note 257, at 29. Moore compares the character theory of
excuse to the more widely accepted choice theory (which asserts that actors are
responsible for actions they had the capacity or opportunity to choose to avoid) and
ultimately rejects the former. See id.
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appears to base responsibility on a person's actions, it actually
assigns blame on the basis of the underlying bad character traits
evidenced by those actions. Moore, within the context of criminal
excuse, explains:
We are prima facie morally responsible and legally liable for
wrongful and illegal acts, but we are only prima facie responsible
and liable because we do not yet know whether such wrongful acts
were truly expressive of our characters. If they are, we are actually
responsible and liable; if they are not, we are neither. The
excuses, in such a case, serve to filter out wrongful actions for
which we are not responsible because they are not expressive of
our character. In such a way the excuses reconcile the ultimate
nature of moral responsibility-it is for character, not action-with
the surface features of our moral and legal ascriptions: namely,
that they are for actions and not character.
2 60
A simple example involves a crime performed while under the
influence of drugs. If Len is a law-abiding citizen, and is involun-
tarily injected with a drug that transforms his normally calm
personality into that of a homicidal sociopath, it seems intuitively
correct not to hold Len responsible for killing Thom while in that
state. It seems as if "Len," as in Len's character, did not commit
the crime. In other words, we do not punish Len for the act of
killing Thom because the act was not at all expressive of Len's true
character.261 By focusing only on character we are able to avoid
relying on mental state suppositions.
The theory applies equally well in the case of provocation.
Instead of determining whether a person's "will" was "overborne"
by her emotions, courts view prima facie bad acts as vital clues to
the nature of the defendant's character. If the neurological disposi-
tions provoking these acts are "good" dispositions, in that they fit
260 Id. at 41.
261 Presumably the relationship between action and character in a particular case
would be defined at trial, but first the character theorist must elucidate which aspects
of the person count as character traits and which do not. As Moore notes, the
distinction is far from obvious. For example, does an actor's character include only
those traits she identifies as constituting her personality, or does it include, as Freud
might assert, aspects of her "subconscious?" Or should character perhaps be defined
only as the sum of a person's past behaviors? See id. at 43. Note also the tempting
trap of fleshing out a person's character traits by assessing what that person believes.
Doing so leads us back to supposing propositional attitudes, a folk-psychological
pitfall. This "character constitution" problem is not insurmountable, but a careful
delineation of the accepted boundaries of "character" would be an essential part of
a refined character theory of criminal responsibility.
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some socially set definition of goodness, the actor is determined to
have good character and is acquitted; if the tendencies motivating
action are "bad" ones (the neurophysiological replacements for what
we call hatred, greed, or whatever), this indicates bad character, and
the actor is held responsible. This scenario is actually similar to
current legal applications of the provocation defense, under which
we seem to judge the quality of emotions motivating provoked acts.
If the emotion of blind, envious hatred, for example, compels you
to kill, no court hesitates to convict you of murder. But if that
emotion is grief, righteous indignation, or some other emotion
society finds morally acceptable, you might be guilty of only
manslaughter. Other defense doctrines lend themselves to
reconstruction within a character framework: For example, in cases
of necessity and duress, a defendant would be permitted to escape
responsibility for her acts when those acts are not indicative of her
personal character but instead are induced by external forces that
overcome her naturally good character traits.
The character theory is thus able to assess blameworthiness
without relying on any psychological pretensions. The quality of the
actor's character is presumably surmised through some kind of fact-
finding tribunal, and the act performed is determined to instantiate
that character or not. No mental state suppositions are required to
determine the defendant's culpability. All analyses are based on
observable conduct and its connection to whatever internal and
behavioral components are found to constitute personal character.
Blaming persons only for evidencing bad character does create
some difficulties. An initial theoretical puzzle is whether any of us
are truly responsible for our characters. The character theory
requires that all persons be held accountable for the kinds of
persons they are-for their traits of kindness, hatred, honesty,
diligence, and a host of others. Moore does not find this prob-
lematic,262 but recent literature supporting the exoneration of
criminal defendants on the basis of a harsh sociological background
implies otherwise. 263 For example, if courts acquit defendants
who grow up in the inner city without parents because they do not
enjoy the internal moral constraints bestowed by safer neighbor-
262 See id. at 45 ("I think it is obvious that, in some sense, we are responsible for
being the kind of people that we are ...
2.3 See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV.
385, 396, 401-03 (1976) (arguing that social and economic background should be
considered as mitigating factors in assessing criminal responsibility).
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hoods and strong parental figures, is not their excusal based on
character aspects for which they are not held responsible?
264
Proponents of acquittals in these instances would apparently not
agree that all persons are responsible for their character traits.
A more startling implication of the character theory is that
persons may logically be punished for bad character even in the
absence of any act. If character is the core of responsibility, and
physical acts are only proxies for that core, then why not directly
punish people for having bad character, instead of waiting for the
actions that express it?265 The character theory seems to commit
its supporters to this view, and as Moore points out, no one
deserves punishment merely for being "a poor specimen of
humanity."
266
Finally, the character theory cannot distinguish between certain
morally relevant factors. For example, the doctrine of mistake-in-
fact might easily lend itself to reconstruction as an aspect of
character-based legal theory, but how can we (or a court) discern
between an actor who makes unreasonable mistakes because of a
complete indifference to the concerns of the criminal law, and the
actor who commits unreasonable mistakes because he is careless,
but generally a nice guy? The former individual possesses bad
character (a lack of appreciation for the rule of law), and the latter
person generally embodies good character, despite the undesirable
but innocuous trait of carelessness. The determination might be
made easier by a neuroscientific analysis of the actor's brain states,
but barring that kind of empirical assessment, making the distinc-
tion is a problem.
264 Moore would presumably argue that this person was simply "morally unlucky,"
due to her disadvantaged background, and still responsible for her character and the
acts to which it led. See Moore, supra note 257, at 46.
265 See id. at 55. The reader may note that without mental state suppositions and
relying on the character theory as stated here, the only way to determine if an
individual has bad character is by analyzing actual acts she has performed, and so a
determination of bad character cannot even be made without waiting for some illegal
action on the part of the person. The answer to this seems to be that an assessment
of bad character need not depend on performance of illegal acts, per se. Many
behaviors are considered immoral, but not illegal. A sufficient record of such
behaviors might cause a societal determination of bad character in the individual, and
lead to incarceration without relying on a specifically illegal act.
In addition, advanced science may be able to track neurological and genetic
dispositions toward good and bad behavior, making the assessment of character less
dependent on an actual act.
26Id.
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Despite these objections, the character theory has potential.
With some tinkering and perhaps a bit of Dennett's intentional
fiction to fill certain gaps, it could be successfully employed to put
the old wine of the criminal law into a new and mental-state-free
bottle. The serious theorist of character-based legal responsibility
would have to define the accepted boundaries of personal character
for legal purposes, and specify what neurological activity instantiates
legally punishable character. She would also have to import an act
requirement into the theory, to avoid punishing persons merely for
not reaching some required level of personal integrity.
b. Economics-Based Theories of Behavior
Another redescription that would obviate reliance on mental
state psychology is one drawn from economic theory. On such a
view, what a person "intends" to do is equated with what it is
"rational" for that person to do. The legal description is shifted
from an assessment of internal states to an external, almost
behavioral account. Actions, including crimes, are performed to
maximize resources. By following this axiom, the law can distribute
punishments and rewards in such a manner as to deter behaviors it
deems undesirable-if the known costs of an act are high enough, a
resource-conscious populace will be discouraged from performing
it. No reference to "mental states" is required.
The above thesis essentially mimics the position ofJudge Posner,
whose economics-based legal view was detailed more fully earlier in
this Comment.267 It also suffers from the same criticisms previ-
ously leveled at Posner's account, 268 most importantly, that
Posner and other economic theorists do not really avoid mental
state attributions. Even if we allow the economic theorists to
attribute a minimalist form of "rationality" to actors, in that an
average actor will behave predictably-for whatever reason-
according to certain standards, economics-based legal theory still
relies on propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires. When
Posner asserts, for example, that tort liability rules will influence
future behavior,269 he does not explain exactly how that is possi-
267 See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text. For a meticulous defense of the
economic model of law, see PaulJ. Heald &James E. Heald, Mindlesness and Law, 77
VA. L. REV. 1127 (1991).
268 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
269 See, e.g., RICHARDJ. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 187, 202-04 (4th ed.
1992) (noting that beyond compensation, deterrence is the central economic function
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ble. Unless Posner envisions some brute, external force dictating
the actions of persons' bodies, he implicitly relies on beliefs and
desires. Legal rules presumably influence future behavior because
the potential actor believes there will be certain repercussions
following certain behaviors, and so does or does not perform a
certain act, depending on whether the actor fears those repercus-
sions will damage her resources. Because economics-based legal
theory requires a risk-averse populace deterred by the threat of
resource depletion, typical economic redescriptions cannot operate
without some folk-psychological support.
The similarity between economic theory and behaviorism,
however, guides the way to avoiding the cognitive trap ensnaring
Posner and other economic theorists. Both rely on deterrence-the
calculated dispensation of punishment to prevent the occurrence of
undesirable acts. Posner is unsuccessful in his attempt to explain
the law without mental state attributions because he relies on a
concept of deterrence entailing beliefs and fears. What he does not
mention is that behaviorism shows that deterrence requires nothing
of the kind. B.F. Skinner elicited complex actions from rats and
pigeons through a refined regimen of rewards and punish-
ments, 270 and few would presume that those creatures possess
beliefs and fears as we understand them. Skinner was able to
condition his animals to behave in a certain manner at specified
times through a method of deterrence that makes no pretensions of
mental state attribution. He simply rewarded or punished them for
performing (or not performing) certain acts at certain times. This
conception of deterrence might lend itself to a semi-utilitarian
design of the law that avoids folk-psychological elements. This
design is discussed below.
c. Utilitarianism and Avoidance of Mental States
Once mental states are removed from the economic theory of
law, that theory can no longer preserve the law as it currently
stands, and it leads us to a partially utilitarian rationale for avoiding
individual psychology. If that step is taken, the law can then
progress indefinitely, unmolested by neuroscientific intrusions. The
new underlying legal framework would generate a legal system
unrelated to explanations of human cognition and volition.
of the civil negligence system).
270 See GLErrMAN, supra note 60, at 80.
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We arrive at a utilitarian answer because any theory of pun-
ishment that might allow society to avoid psychological assessments
cannot entail moral judgments of individual actions as a factor in
distributions of blame. As mentioned earlier, any system of laws
that purports to assign blame on the basis of moral responsibility
inherently relies on some view of psychology, and here we are
attempting to skirt that reliance. This eliminates most nonconsequ-
entialist theories of punishment and leaves us to mold a utilitarian
explanation for society's new criminal justice system.
271
The classical premise of utilitarian legal theory is that "the
purpose of all laws is to maximize the net happiness of soci-
ety,"272 and happiness entails minimizing the occurrence of acts
that damage the community. The method of happiness maximi-
zation derives economic legal theories-punishment for certain acts
is dispensed to persons in the hope that (a) they will be conditioned
to avoid a particular behavior in the future, and (b) other persons
will also be deterred from the same conduct by fear of suffering
whatever befell those who committed the illegal acts. 278 For our
purposes, the standard utilitarian theme must be slightly altered to
remove the second prong of the rationale. The deterrence of Thom
by punishment of Len relies unavoidably on the mental state of fear.
Even Skinner could not affect the behavior of one rat by punishing
another.
One can envision a legal system concerned only with the greater
good of the community, defined as general social order, an absence
of needless violence, and whatever other factors are considered
important. Punishment, as conditioning against future illegal
behavior, is also designed to remove the bad actor from the society
she has damaged. This segregation ensures that the bad actor does
not cause further harm. A correlation exists between the amount
of punishment dispensed (probably confinement) and the amount
271 The economic redescriptions of law discussed in the previous section actually
come close to presenting a utilitarian rationale. Under the economic rubric, behavior
is thought of as guided by what goods are to be gained, instead of by moral
injunction. The difference between the utilitarian design discussed here and the
economic theory of behavior is that the former envisions elimination of all
nonutilitarian aspects, since those tend to draw mental state suppositions into the
picture. As noted earlier, the standard economic explanation of behavior relies on
the beliefs and fears necessary for proper deterrence.
272 DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 4 (citing Jeremy Bentham as the principal
proponent of this idea).
Dressler calls these goals "specific and "general" deterrence, respectively. See
id. at 5.
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of quantifiable damage society has suffered as a result of an
individual's behavior. The more severe the crime, the longer the
actor is segregated from the community.
This system avoids mental state attributions by following a
Skinnerian conception of deterrence and by measuring punishment
only in relation to damage done. The sole issue for a factfinder is
the amount of disutility inflicted on the whole, not any morally
culpable state in the individual. This shift greatly changes the law
as it currently operates, since no internal motivations or states act
as mitigating factors-defenses such as provocation and insanity are
not available, 274 and there are no varying degrees of punishment
corresponding to the mental state of the actor at the time of the
offense. Confinement is not for rehabilitative purposes as currently
conceived, since that requires folk psychology, but it does condition
the behavior of the human animal and prevent further damage to
society. Other benefits are gained if neuroscience allows for the
precise neurophysiological alteration of inmates to prevent future
illegal conduct; since appeal to beliefs and desires is impossible, the
bad actor might be chemically altered to remove the threat of
further harm. If manipulations of an actor's neuro-anatomical
design are ineffective or impossible, this utilitarian-type legal system
could countenance life-long confinement, constant drug-induced
subservience, or the death penalty in an effort to avoid further harm
to the community.
Such a system seems the least desirable of alternatives. Unlike
the intentional stance, the character theory, and supposedly the
economic theory, it does not leave the current legal system mostly
intact. That goal is pursued in an effort to avoid drastic legal
changes and their attendant social upheavals. Further, instead of
substituting defunct folk psychology with a new vision of behavior
grounded in neurophysiology, the new utilitarian alternative avoids
addressing the internal workings of individuals altogether.
Eliminative materialists would not support adoption of this system
even though it avoids folk psychology, since it also avoids the
neuroscience that those philosophers believe will lead to more just
274 Note that under such a system defenses like necessity and duress might be
available, since if an actor commits what would be a criminal act but in so doing
prevents a worse damage to society from occurring, the net effect is that he has
benefitted society. Also, in such a case the force or person causing the actor to act
out of necessity or under duress would be held responsible for the harm inflicted by
the actor, since it is she, rather than the actor, who is considered to have actually
caused the harm.
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adjudications. 275 An accurate explanation of human behavior
would ensure more accurate assignments of responsibility, so
completely ignoring the details of physiology is not a recommended
solution.
None of the suggestions in this section are problem-free.
Dennett's conception of the intentional stance is a fiction of
intentionality preserved for the criminal law. The character theory
of responsibility is the most useful of the redescriptions suggested,
but it has major difficulties that must be resolved. The economic
theory is viable if it is influenced by behavioral theory, but by itself
it cannot fulfill Posner's claim that an economic recharacterization
of the law can both avoid mental state attributions and leave the
current law intact. Finally, the utilitarian approach too greatly
changes current legal mechanics and avoids all cognitive theory to
the detriment of society.
The most desirable alternative might actually be to leave intact,
for legal purposes, some degree of intentionality (albeit fictional).
From that basis society might seek to partially reconcile the law with
profound changes in cognitive science, without discarding thou-
sands of years of legal evolution. In the spirit of reconciliation, the
next section reduces the discussion to a more specific level;
assuming that the current law already relies on a fictional system of
intentionality, it explores potential changes based on recent
neurophysiological theorizing-that of Libet and Dennett.
B. Specific Legal Accommodations of Libet and Dennett
The theories of Libet and the eliminative materialists strongly
imply that the folk-psychological conception of volition-a process
of propositional attitudes leading to intentions and thus physical
action-is not accurate. However, despite Libet's findings and the
proposed theoretical revisions above, it simply may not be possible
to excise notions of personal choice and intentionality as we
currently employ them. A fictional account is the easiest alternative.
Indeed, philosophers such as Peter Strawson maintain that this is
our only alternative. They insist that metaphysical debates over
issues such as intentionality, determinism, and free will are of no
consequence, since free will is a fundamental element of human
275 Cf. CHURCHLAND, supra note 9, at 45 ("The simple increase in mutual
understanding that [eliminative materialism] made possible could contribute
substantially toward a more peaceful and humane society.").
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nature and we are unable even to contemplate its negation.
276
For Strawson, the reactions and judgments we make in response to
others' actions are so central to our existence that they "neither
call[] for, nor permit" rational explanation, and thus commit us to
an acceptance of free choice regardless of theoretical disputes.
277
No matter what one thinks of the fundamental status of free will,
legal reliance on a doctrine of intentionality is deeply imbedded and
may minimally persist regardless of the arguments mounted by
eliminativists and neurophysiologists and whatever clever legal
reconstructions are proposed. In light of this entrenched position,
perhaps some compromises can be reached between traditional legal
doctrines and the eliminativist picture of human behavior that will
reflect realistic possibilities for a legal accommodation of eliminativ-
ist conclusions. None of these alterations will approach the
magnitude of those discussed in the previous section, but they may
at least turn the criminal law in the direction that cognitive science
appears to be going.
The current law, faithful to folk psychology, holds an individual
responsible "only for those consequences that are caused by his
actions, and not for those things in which his body, but not his
acting self, is causally implicated." 278 If we accept Libet's findings
alone, without the backdrop of Dennett's model, we are left with
beliefs and desires leading directly to volitions, without the presence
of an intention until after the volition is formed and about 250
milliseconds from execution. 279 With the combination of Libet
and Dennett, Libet's findings become a bit more palatable to the
conceptually queasy, but we are still left not quite as "intentional"
as we supposed ourselves to be. That description is apt in light of
Dennett's intentionality fiction-humans are complex machines to
which we attribute an "intentional stance," but as we parse the
neuro-anatomical workings of voluntary motions, we uncover a
design stance, and this is understandably disturbing. Human action
276 See P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentmen, in FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND
OTHER ESSAYS 1, 3-4 (1974) (arguing that even if determinism is accepted, there will
still exist some degree of free will in human behavior).
277 Id. at 23.
278 Moore, supra note 64, at 1567.
279 See supra note 231 and accompanying text. Saunders's discussion of volition
and criminal acts roughly hypothesizes the findings of Libet: "If volitions cause acts,
the mind is the causal agent. If volitions do not cause acts, the mind might be seen
as approving the act but not involved and so, perhaps, not culpable." Saunders, supra
note 100, at 454 n.47.
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can now be explained as a mechanical occurrence instead of the
result of conscious decisionmaking. Dennett realizes this in another
context:
Wholesale abandonment of the Intentional is in any case a less
pressing concern than partial erosion of the Intentional domain,
an eventuality against which there are no conceptual guarantees at
all. If the growing area of success in mechanistic explanation of
human behavior does not in itself rob us of responsibility, it does
make it more pragmatic, more effective or efficient, for people on
occasion to adopt less than the Intentional stance toward others.
Until fairly recently the only well-known generally effective method
of getting people to do what you wanted them to was to treat them
as persons. One might threaten, torture, trick, misinform, bribe
them, but at least these were forms of control and coercion that
appealed to or exploited man's rationality.... The advent of
brainwashing, subliminal advertising, hypnotism and... the more
direct physical tampering with drugs and surgical intervention, for
the first time make the choice of stance a genuine one.
280
Dennett wrote this passage twenty years ago, foreshadowing the
neuroscience that is now eroding our "Intentional domain" and its
legal inhabitants.
Saunders notes: "If the mind, through its volitions, causes the
body to act, the mind is culpable for those acts. If the mind is not
so directly involved, allowing the mind to play such an active role in
the attribution of actus reus is on less firm ground." 281 No longer
secured, we have lost confidence in the fundamental truth of folk
psychology, and yet we have a neuroscience too youthful to provide
an adequately detailed substitute. Folk psychology appears mostly
wrong, and the true workings of the brain mostly unknown, but the
need for legal coherence remains. Shaken in our ability to assess
intentionality and now relying on a fictional account, can we morally
punish "intentional" actors more severely than others? Can we
justifiably condemn that which we can no longer fully explain?
28 2
280 Dennett, supra note 244, at 182. An interesting consideration: If neuroscience
were to enable us to cleanly eliminate any person's desire to kill, should we make use
of this power? As Dennett rhetorically asks, "What if mass hypnosis could make
people stop wanting to smoke?" Id.
281 Saunders, supra note 100, at 461. Note Saunders's fully dualist stance. He
discusses the "mind" as something distinct from the "body."
282 There are critiques of Libet's work, for example, that are far more damaging
to notions of intentionality than anything Libet himself implied, and they further
confuse our definition of intention. Building on William James's interpretation of
volitions as "anticipatory images" of actions, one commentary gives a different
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1. Eroding the Intentional
The Model Penal Code has this to say about intentional actions:
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that
nature or to cause such a result .... 2
8 3
It would appear that this definition requires some revision, since we
now must doubt whether it can ever be our "conscious object" to do
particular acts in the manner intended by the Code.284  If our
conduct is unconsciously initiated and then consummated if not
stopped within a narrow window of opportunity, acting "intentional-
ly" loses the ring of culpability it once possessed. We may not need
to eliminate the intentional concept completely, but we are in a
precarious position.
account of Libet's discovery:
An unconsciously generated action initiative (signaled by the RP) brings
about a corollary discharge image of the action in consciousness at a
somewhat later time, which in turn provokes a secondary affective "urge" to
match motor behavior to the image. The image and urge together constitute
[a volition] .... According to this model, however, [a volition] is a
conscious correlate of feedforward regulatory processes rather than an
intentional decision by a human agent .... To claim that [a volition] causes
the action would be erroneous in the same sense that it would be incorrect
to assert that activation of a radar system causes the airplane to take offjust
because the pilot generally turns on the radar, for guidance purposes, prior
to takeoff.
Ralph E. Hoffman & Richard E. Kravitz, Feedforward Action Regulation and the
Experience of Will, 10 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sc. 782, 783 (1987). In other words,
Hoffman and Kravitz argue that the volition is not a causal factor at all-it merely
emerges from cerebral processes dictating movement and prompts the person to
match his actual behavior to the "suggestion" of his unconscious. It has no power,
veto" or otherwise.
283 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i).
284 Interestingly, the Model Code's psychological view was criticized ten years ago
by Professor Harold Edgar:
[T]he psychological model of conduct underlying the Code, the idea that we
act by willing discrete behaviors, reflects ancient psychology. Surely it is a
fiction; no homunculus lives inside the brain, sending out orders to animate
the limbs. Although the law can live happily with fictions, the acceptance
of fictions usually marks issues the law seeks to avoid, not ones it confronts.
Harold Edgar, Mens Rea, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1028, 1038
(Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). In part IV.A.1 I will consider the use of legal fictions
in dealing with eliminative difficulties.
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One option is to expand and weaken the definition of inten-
tionality. Since inaccessible brain events are involved, we could
define an intention as not just its narrow conscious component, but
as the entire set of neurological processes that culminate in a
physical act, thus deemphasizing the conscious elements relevant to
our current conception of intent. As a folk-psychological artifact,
"intentions" were developed long before anyone had any knowledge
of neurological systems, and a refinement of the concept is probably
overdue. From the legal standpoint, this change would lessen the
moral significance of an act "intentionally" performed, and the
hierarchy of punishment would reflect this alteration. For example,
the Model Penal Code's definitions of "murder,"285 "manslaugh-
ter," 286 and "negligent homicide" 287 would be retained in order
to distinguish between homicides with and without conscious
components, but the retribution due an "intentional" killer would
not greatly outweigh that due a reckless or negligent one. Given
our new knowledge, the division of murder into degrees would be
even more questionable, since imposition of the death penalty
would partially depend on now suspect mentalistic distinctions.
288
The general point here is to revise the law to reflect cognizance of
our biomechanical natures. The decision, however made, to pull
the trigger or use the knife cannot be as morally charged as the law
currently implies. That decision involves a good dose of passivity,
since the consciousness component, far from choosing the action,
may only monitor or obstruct volitional outcomes.
Assessments of culpability might also benefit from a limited
character-type analysis of responsibility, 289 instead of relying
solely on the dubious ontology of intention. Even without the
advantage of clearly defined intentionality, the law must still
differentiate between the killer who planned the act for three weeks
and the one who committed the act spontaneously, or between the
actor who killed out of anger and the one who killed accidentally.
Since intention can no longer provide a meaningful distinction,
analysis of underlying character may fill the resulting gap in
attributions of blame.
285 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2.
286 Id. § 210.3.
287 Id. § 210.4.
288 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1988) (designating death penalty or
imprisonment for a minimum of 25 years to life for first degree murder but only
imprisonment for a minimum of 15 years to life for second degree murder).
289 See supra notes 257-66 and accompanying text.
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2. Rethinking Our Defenses
a. Provocation
Our revised view of intentions is also applicable to the area of
criminal defenses, although the general theme of "loosening" the
legal significance of "intentional" action still applies. Consider the
provocation defense, which reduces the level of culpability for a
killing from murder to manslaughter. Though some courts have
implied otherwise, 290 provoked killings are intentional ones, and
our new model of the brain further informs the "provocation"
phenomenon. Consider the classic example: Thom stumbles upon
Len engaged in sexual intercourse with Thom's wife. Thom, duly
enraged, kills Len. Thom will most likely be convicted of man-
slaughter, having claimed provocation as a mitigating factor. The
rationale for that defense might be that Thom succumbed to the
human weaknesses that occasionally catch us all, so he is not a "bad
character" in need of the most severe social sanction. 291 Or, it
might be argued that Thom's deep emotions overrode his ability to
respect legal and moral mandates, so he could not control his
conduct.292 What we can now say is that a particularly powerful
coalition of subsystems, driven by input from sensory subsystems,
"swept into power" and dictated the actions of the body that is
Thom. The strength of this grouping of systems arose from both
the intensity of the sensory input and a lack of competition from
other systems. There may have been only one "possible" course of
action for Thom; if there was no struggle among coalitions of
neuronal systems for satisfaction, no cerebrally proposed action
alternatives besides beating Len to death,293 did that "unanimous"
set of neuronal structures create a force strong enough to counter
Thom's remaining brain systems? 294 Perhaps those brain systems,
M Professor Dressier cites Holmes v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946] 2 All
E.R. 124 (Eng.), as an example of a court finding a lack of specific intent to kill in a
case involving a provocation defense. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 475 n.13.
291 See id. at 475 ("The provoked killer acts due to anger, not evilness.").
292 See id. at 476 (noting that "deep emotion ... undermines [the] capacity to
respond in a legally and morally appropriate fashion").
293 Perhaps a more illuminating way of phrasing this is to say that Thom could not
at that moment "conceive" of doing anything else. He could not "conceive" of
another alternative because all parts of his brain were in an "agreement" of sorts.
M In Consciousness Explained, Dennett does not address the idea of variable power
among groups of subsytems depending on their 'size" or "support." See Dennett,
supra note 40, at 210. If our new schematic for volition is beginning to sound
remarkably similar to a democratic election, note that Dennett himself makes use of
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
or parts of several systems, involved in the storage of moral and
social constraints?
This explanation of provocation makes a certain amount of
intuitive sense. Couched in traditional terms, a rising tide of mental
[neuronal] protestation [subsystems] makes Thom kill Len before he
can stop [veto] himself. Put differently, our explanation sounds
remarkably like saying, in the language of folk psychology, that
Thom's emotions overcame his capacities as a practical reason-
er.295 We must also remember one important facet of our new
brain model: the powerful coalition of subsystems calling for Len's
demise does not "intrude" upon an already existing awareness.
Under Dennett's model, this coalition becomes Thom's awareness,
since consciousness is an outgrowth of series of coalitions dominat-
ing in succession-any competition between coalitions for domi-
nance occurs in a preconscious stage. We could even cast Thom as
an automaton of sorts, operating purely from the "design" stance,
following the instructions of a temporary but overwhelming
neuronal program.
Our re-explanation of the provocation defense may warrant a
liberalization of its use, depending on what more we learn about the
neurophysiological workings involved. This is not a problem, if one
assumes that neurophysiological explanations can only lead to a
more just assessment of the merits of this defense in a particular
case.
b. Force of Habit
To fall into a habit is to begin to cease to be.
296
Renewed talk of the unconscious might resurrect consideration
of a defense based on motions performed habitually. Should there
be a "habit defense," exonerating those who perform criminal acts
by way of habitual motions? The Model Penal Code gives a pretty
the analogy. See Daniel C. Dennett, The Origins of Selves, 2 Cocrro 163, 171-73
(1989).
295 See, e.g., Addington v. United States, 165 U.S. 184, 186 (1897) (allowing
mitigation from murder to manslaughter when the provocation renders "any
ordinarily prudent person for the time being incapable of that cool reflection that
otherwise makes it murder"); Moore, supra note 36, at 1148 ("[E]xcuses are all related
to the exercise of the actor's practical reasoning capacities.").
296 THE CONCISE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 117 (Robert Andrews
ed., 1989) (quoting Miguel de Unamuno).
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solid "no" to this question,297 specifically removing habitual
movements from its definition of acts not voluntarily performed.
Should the Code be revised? It has been said that "[o]ne whose
body moves, while the mind is totally engrossed in thought, appears
to be lacking volition."298 Perhaps we can restate this dualist
explanation within the framework of our new brain-conception: the
brain, hard-wired to prioritize for efficiency,299 removes some
activities from current "awareness" to allow consciousness to pursue
other, higher tasks. These activities, surely composed by smaller
neuronal subsystem groupings, may work "in the background," like
the clock functions of some computers, and never become part of
the series of subsystem coalitions constituting awareness. Certain
operations are "automatized," like tying shoelaces.3 0 0 As Moore
points out, this is a desirable mechanism: "At the level of conscious-
ness, I do not pay attention to most ... details of motor movement.
And it is a good thing, for if I had to focus on each [detail of motor
functions], I'd never be able to focus on my larger goals, muse
about philosophy, etc."3 0 1 Consciousness can do just so many
things at once. Certain actions in certain situations will recede to
subconsciousness as we concentrate on larger, or perhaps simply
other, tasks.
30 2
297 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(d) (describing as a nonvoluntary act "a bodily
movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor,
either conscious or habitual") (emphasis added). Commentary on the Code does not
explicate the drafters' decision to include "habit" as a voluntary act, aside from stating
that the provision is "designed to make the requirement of an act a minimal one." Id.
cmt. 2.
298 Saunders, supra note 100, at 460 n.70.
299 For a discussion of intelligence as a product of cerebral efficiency, see supra
note 122.
300 GLEITMAN, supra note 60, at 298.
301 MOORE, supra note 29. Moore gives the example of learning to play the piano,
where the specific strikings of each key are eventually not consciously performed, but
are weaved into greater movement patterns that are consciously executed. See id.
Dennett has noted: "Most of our intentional actions are performed without any
[deliberation], and a good thing, too, since there wouldn't be time." DENNETr, supra
note 40, at 252.
302 Arthur Danto notes:
Choosings between alternative courses of action, in the preponderance of
motor acts we perform, occur as the outcome of deliberations of which we
are barely conscious, if at all. A slow-motion film of Matisse shows the artist
making countless decisions with his fingers that at normal speeds look like
a single confident chalk stroke defining the edge of a leaf. He may or may
not have been conscious of each decision, but I suspect that he was
conscious only of drawing a leaf.
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The Model Penal Code does note that "bodily movement[s]
during unconsciousness" are not voluntary acts. 03 Is this consis-
tent with the now-expanded role of nonconscious activity? Our
efficiency proposal implies that habitual activity is not conscious at
all. The Code Commentary reveals that the term "voluntary" is
meant to encompass "conduct that is within the control of the
actor."304 Libet has shown us that even "voluntary" movements
may not be initiated consciously. If well-worn neural pathways in
the brain predispose the body to a certain repetitive movement
without the need for consciousness (since perhaps "awareness" of
the movement would decrease efficiency), can we say the movement
is voluntary? If repetition has caused a background set of neuron
structures to operate without needing to be a member of the
neuron group currently "in power," can we hold the person
responsible for her structural tendency toward operational efficien-
cy?
These questions would arise in only a narrow set of cases, and
the legal alterations might not be major. Driving a car provides an
example with which most of us can identify: You are commuting to
work and become so absorbed in your thinking that after you arrive
at your destination it occurs to you that you remember absolutely
nothing of the trip or anything you saw during it. Or, "lost in
thought," you drive to an oft-visited location such as your place of
work instead of to the grocery store, which is where you originally
meant to go. In neither of these instances were you conscious of
driving the car. A repetitive and well-practiced behavior, automo-
bile operation drops from consciousness and operates in the
background, while awareness is taken over by neuronal subsystems
devoted to whatever cognitive endeavor preferred. The driving
process can be so completely programmed that if not consciously
guided, the "default setting" will bring the driver to a well-known
destination, whether intended for this trip or not. The driver is
"conscious" of Beethoven's Ninth or his plans for the next day, but
Danto, supra note 235, at 541. For an extensive, if somewhat dated, account of
volitions that also supports this conclusion, see Gregory A. Kimble & Lawrence C.
Perlmuter, The Problem of Volition, 77 PSYCHOL. REV. 361, 373-81 (1970) ("Highly
practiced acts tend to recede from consciousness, to become routinized and automatic
and, in that sense, involuntary.").
303 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(b).
304 Id. § 2.01 cmt. 1.
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not "conscious" of acceleration, deceleration, or whatever is in the
road ahead.
Now say our particular driver, Thom, "daydreaming," runs over
Len quite "unintentionally." It is light out and Thom is sober,
driving on a straight patch of road with his eyeballs positioned to
accept input from directly ahead of the car. Thom, however, does
not "see" Len walk into the street, and as a result runs him over.
We will avoid the "act/omission" question by asserting that Thom
was steadily accelerating when he hit Len. Under current law, the
case for Thorn "knowingly" running down Len could be plausibly
made, since from the viewpoint of a third party it would appear that
Thorn could clearly see Len directly in front of him on that sunny
day. On the other hand, if Thom can convince a court that he really
was "daydreaming," he might avoid a conviction for murder. Of
course, he would not avoid blame altogether; the case for man-
slaughter could definitely be made on the grounds that Thom was
at least reckless in his conduct-how dare he daydream while
driving?
In light of our new considerations, however, it appears that (a)
Thorn did not knowingly run over Len, because neither his driving
behaviors nor his visual input currently held sway in consciousness,
and (b) Thorn did not recklessly collide with Len because Thorn
merely fell victim to an "operational protocol" of his standard
human body-when a behavior does not require consciousness,
remove it, and make room for more complex cognitive endeavors.
Thorn did not even perform a "voluntary act" in this vehicular
homicide, even though he steadily accelerated to Len's position in
the road. 0 5
Thom might be held to have acted negligently, since he "allowed
himself " 30 6 to slip off into wool-gathering. Indeed, most would
agree that he should have been aware 30 7 of Len (most likely day-
dreaming himself, not conscious of his walking movements or the
305 After the collision, consciousness is obviously returned to driving-related
subjects, since (a) obstruction of a habit will return the attendant movement to
consciousness, see Kimble & Perlmuter, supra note 302, at 376, and (b) the collision
is now the most complex cognitive problem demanding Thorn's attention.
306 This colloquialism is no longer accurate. Thorn is designed to submerge
processes not needing his immediate attention. Automatization of behaviors is not
a matter of irresponsibility. Such processes would have to be consciously resisted on
an ongoingbasis in order to avoid Thom's situation. Such resistance to habit forming
is probably not possible for a normally functioning human being.
307 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (defining negligence).
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curb ahead) crossing the street. But did Thom evidence a "gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe?" 308 Maybe not-we might argue that reasonable persons
with efficient brains will, by definition, develop automatized
patterns such as car operation. Policy considerations, however,
would dictate that we not relieve Thom of all culpability. The need
to encourage citizens to resist the automatization process so as to
increase public (and pedestrian) safety is strong enough to justify
holding Thom negligent.
The goal here, once again, is to decrease the law's ability to
assign intentionality to its subjects, or to attach less moral signifi-
cance to findings of intention than is currently done. Moore points
out that automatized behaviors are "nonetheless accessible to
consciousness"309 if the actor redirects his attention, so Moore
would presumably agree with the Model Penal Code's definition of
habitual movement as voluntary behavior. True or not, social policy
considerations probably militate in favor of the Code's viewpoint;
safety concerns motivate punishment of habitual actors as negligent
in order to promote attentiveness to potentially dangerous activities.
We need not specifically narrow the actus reus requirement for
phenomena such as habitual movement, but consideration of the
automatization process does contribute to the overall necessity of
reconsidering intentionality with a skeptical eye.
C. The Ultimate Implication of Eliminativism: Our Selves in Doubt
In the above proposals we see the beginnings of legal reform
based on eliminativist claims, the least of which is a loosening of
legal reliance on the propositional attitude of "intention." But
analyzing the legal nuances of an expanded definition of intention
or even re-explaining legal mechanics to avoid mental states is nit-
picking compared to the ramifications of eliminative materialism for
the elemental concept of personal identity. We considered the
Libet-Dennett combination within the framework of present-day law,
law that is grounded in folk psychology. While this was an informa-
tive inquiry yielding potential solutions to the dilemmas presented
by Libet and Dennett, the broader eliminativist model threatens to
sweep the law away. There is a consequence of eliminativism that
was previously touched upon but not explicitly stated: by exploding
308 Id.
309 MOORE, supra note 29.
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the myth of the unitary mind, eliminative materialism has destroyed
the conception of a unified self. Neuroscience today refutes what we
have been calling Cartesian materialism, and Dennett's "multiple
drafts" model of simultaneously operating neuronal structures
seems to be accurate. Since there is no "central command" guiding
behavior, how do we blame an entire body for its actions at any one
time? Remember the characterization of Dennett's competing
neuronal coalitions as a "political community. " 3 1° If conscious-
ness is composed of a chain of neuronal groupings rising and falling
in succession, how can the law blame an individual at time x for
actions taken at time y? Who is it that the law is blaming for the
crime?
311
Dennett's proposal would not be the first to question our belief
in a singular self. Freud divided the self into several components,
finding an ego, superego, and id to affect the body's behaviors.
3 12
From a different standpoint, Thomas Nagel, after considering
neurophysiological experiments in which severed hemispheres of
310 See Dennett, supra note 294, at 171-73.
311 Dennett realizes the implications of an eliminative model: "[T]he self... turns
out to be a valuable abstraction, a theorist's fiction rather than an internal observer
or boss." DENNETT, supra note 40, at 431. Dennett sees all animals as possessing a
"functional sense of self" in that they operate to ensure their own survival, but
considers the mind or the soul to be "'the most tenacious bad idea bedeviling our
attempts to think about consciousness.'" Gelman, supra note 123, at 71 (quoting
Daniel Dennett).
It should be noted that different bodies can act independently of one another and
yet not possess individual selves. That is, two beings presented with the same
situation may react similarly, but they will not react identically. Therefore, are they
not exhibiting individual selves, since they react differently to the same circumstances?
Not necessarily. According to Dennett's model, the development of neuronal
subsystems is affected by environmental factors that make each being differ from
others, and this accounts for differing reactions to the same stimuli. However, the
problem of assigning blame still remains. When an action is performed, a certain
coalition of systems is responsible for it, and there is no way to determine which
systems they are. Regardless, if the being is to be punished, we are unable to punish
certain neurological systems and not others, and punishing the whole, under
Dennett's approach, would seem tantamount to punishing a computer system for
actions performed while running a certain program.
312 Moore, supra note 64, at 1633. Moore considers the fragmentation of self
implied by Freud's ideas, finding that "the common sense notion of the unified self
can withstand any of the insights or phenomena that generated the psychoanalytic
subdivisions of self. Indeed, the common sense concept of a unified self better
accommodates those insights and phenomena than do the Freudian subdivisions."
Id. at 1634.
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
the brain were made to operate independently,3 1 3 also doubted
the truth of the "single mind":
[W]e take ourselves as paradigms of psychological unity, and are
... subtly ignoring the possibility that our own unity may be
nothing absolute, but merely another case of integration, more or
less effective, in the control system of a complex organism. This
system speaks in the first person singular through our mouths, and
that makes it understandable that we should think of its unity as
in some sense numerically absolute, rather than relative and a
function of the integration of its contents.
But this is quite genuinely an illusion.
3 14
Revealing the self as a facade for jostling teams of neurons
makes assignments of moral responsibility problematic. Blaming a
person for a particular action at a particular time is now akin to
blaming a computer for running a particular program. The analogy
fails in that an external actor loads the programs the computer runs,
while our neurological programs are internally chosen. But under
our model they are not "chosen" by anything in particular, emerging
instead from a combination of influences involving no master
coordinator.
3 15
So to whom is responsibility assigned? Our morality requires
specific shoulders to bear its moral burdens. Who has rights under
the law? Who has obligations and responsibilities? If the law cannot
rely on the existence of a unified self, it cannot coherently blame
human beings for specific actions. Before any legal revisions can be
based on eliminativism, this problem must be solved.
Making Sense of Multiple Selves
Perhaps we can look to an interesting psychological phenome-
non for guidance. The law's treatment of individuals suffering from
Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) might shed light on potential
methods of assigning moral responsibility to fragmented selves.
313 See generally MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE BISECTED BRAIN (1970) (surveying
research in the area of split brains).
- 14 THOMAs NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 163 (1979).
315 See supra text accompanying notes 204-08, 241.
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a. Multiple Personality Disorder and the Fragmented Self
If we conceive of neuronal combinations as constantly shifting
"subselves" within the human brain, we might draw a parallel
between proposals for legal treatment of MPD and our current
dilemma. MPD is a controversial condition, and some psychological
commentators doubt its existence. 316 The American Psychiatric
Association has acknowledged it, however, and defines the disorder
as follows:
300.14 Multiple Personality Disorder
A. The existence within the person of two or more distinct
personalities or personality states ....
B. At least two of these personalities or personality states
recurrently take full control of the person's behavior.
317
The victim of MPD shifts from personality to personality depending
on her current situation, with no "default" or "master" personality
to designate as her "self." In the legal context, the obvious question
is how to blame body X for criminal acts committed while under
personality Y, when body X is now under personality Z. Since there
is no singular self, is it fair to incarcerate Z for the acts of ?.
We can conceive of the various personalities or "alters"
31 8
within a body in different ways. They may be viewed as completely
different persons, 3 19 different personalities, or facets of one
intricate personality.3 20 The last conception might seem the most
useful for our purposes; it describes the "personality states" of the
APA description, which sound similar to Dennett's shifting neuronal
states or coalitions. But to draw that conclusion is to make once
again the "unitary mistake," supposing that there is a single self,
except with some remarkably distinct subparts. 321 The concep-
316 See Elyn R. Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, 25
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 383,400-01 (1992) (discussing the views of those who are skeptical
about the existence of multiple personality disorder).
317 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, THE DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FROM DSM-
III-R 157 (3d ed. 1987).
318 This term is commonly used "to refer to [MPD sufferers'] different 'aspects'
or 'personalities.'" See Saks, supra note 316, at 386 n.7.
319 See id. at 389, 403-18. Saks is able to make this claim by subscribing to a
psychological definition of personal identity, instead of a physical one. This is not the
place to debate the point, but the psychological view is not without problems. See
generally PETER UNGER, IDENTITY, CONSCIOUSNESS AND VALUE (1990) (making a
convincing case for the physically based view of identity through the use of the
reader's own intuitions, as elicited by hypothetical situations).
320 See Saks, supra note 316, at 389.
321 Saks makes this assumption in her discussion of MPD and legal responsibility.
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tion of MPD most suitable for our needs is actually the second one:
the view that alters are "parts or aspects of persons," 22 not pos-
sessed of any unitary theme except that of being present in the
same body.
Professor Elyn Saks asserts that persons suffering from such a
condition should not be held responsible for their criminal acts. To
support this claim, she presents the example of Pete, a law-abiding
citizen who is drugged and thereby temporarily transformed into
Paul, who kills someone. The drug wears off, and Pete finds himself
in prison, charged with murder.3 23  Saks would exonerate Pete/
Paul under a "character analysis" similar to that discussed
above.324 Since Pete can claim that "'it was not I who act-
ed,'"325 meaning that the act did not reflect his true character, it
would not be fair to blame him. Saks then equates Pete/Paul to a
sufferer of MPD, who might have two personalities, one "nice" and
the other murderous.
3 26
The character-based theory of responsibility is, as Saks herself
admits, a minority view.3 27 But Saks also makes a conceptual
error that renders her analysis unhelpful in our search for a relation
between the eliminative brain-model and legal responsibility. In the
example above, Pete/Paul has a singular self-Pete. He was merely
overcome by drug-induced influences that made him kill. His
situation is no different than that of a drug addict who commits
homicide while in the grips of a delusion. Assessing Pete's
responsibility has nothing to do with questions of self. In contrast,
the MPD sufferer, like our new model of normal brain function,
does not possess a dominant self. She has two equally powerful
personality constructs, and thus no locus on which to pin moral/
legal responsibility.
3 28
See id. at 436-43.
32 Id. at 418.
323 See id. at 419.
324 See id. at 421. Saks also uses the provocation example.
325 Id.
326 See id. at 424 (discussingJohn/Joe, an MPD sufferer, Saks asserts that "[i]f the
character-based theory of responsibility has meritJohn would seem to have an excuse
for Joe's act, just as Pete would for Paul's: the act does not reflect his character").
327 See id. at 431.
28 Saks attempts to justify her stance:
John [one half of an MPD sufferer, the other half beingJoe] cannot say "I
am not guilty because Joe did the act," for that would be to say "I am not
guiltybecause another part of me did the act"--and why would that mean no
guilt? John can, however, say "I am not guilty because the act of that part
1553
1554 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 141:1471
A second proposition for removing MPD sufferers from legal
responsibility is more applicable to their actual condition as
disunified selves, and thus may be more useful to us. The law
excuses an actor if she "did not have the capacity or a fair opportu-
nity not to act,"3 29 a maxim manifested by the insanity defense.
Can the MPD sufferer take advantage of this excuse? Saks notes
that courts have presented two views on this question. Some
maintain that if any of the MPD victim's personalities did not know
of the criminal act, or could not control it, the person should be
released. Others hold that the MPD sufferer is innocent only if the
particular personality state committing the crime itself meets the
insanity test criteria.33 0 Saks supports the former view, which
would release the MPD sufferer on the grounds that a currently
submerged self could not control the act. If correct, this conclusion
might lead us to similar findings for normal persons, whom we now
see as governed by a series of alternately submerged and then
dominant neuron sets.
There are two reasons, however, why this analysis of MPD will
not lead to legal impunity for all. The first is that Saks's argument
in support of this approach is not convincing. She draws an analogy
between the MPD sufferer, who commits crimes while under the
aegis of a certain personality, and the sleepwalker, who commits
crimes while under the influence of a "'sleeping self.'" 3 31 Courts
have released defendants for crimes committed while asleep3 3 2 on
is no reflection on me-we have different characters." The character-based
theory, then, explains whyJohn is innocent ofJoe's crime, though they are
not different people, provided we can say that they have different charac-
ters.
Id. at 424. Saks, whether she intends to or not, suggests thatJohn is the "dominant"
partner of theJohn/Joe relationship, and thus, sinceJohn did not commit the deed,
"he" should not be punished. But if we remember that John andJoe are on equal
footing, the argument loses some of its appeal. Who cares if the crime is no
reflection on the character ofJohn? It is a reflection on the character ofJoe, who is
just as much a part of the body that isJohn/Joe asJohn is. It is not as though John
has returned for good, as Pete does in the drug example. Joe presumably gets equal
cognitive time, and will continue to do so in the future. Do we insist on culpability
in every fiber of a defendant's body and experience before we convict her? Do we
release a defendant because, under some circumstances, she reveals good character?
329 Id. at 431.
330 See id. at 434.
331 Id.
332 See id. at 435 (citing the famous case of The King v. Cogdon (Victoria 1950)
(Austl.) (unreported), in which the court released the sleepwalking Mrs. Cogdon from
responsibility for killing her daughter with an axe). Cogdon is discussed in Norval
Morris, Somnambulistic Homicide: Ghosts, Spiders, and North Koreans, 5 RESJUDICATAE
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the ground that the sleepwalker has a dominant self that the law
realizes is not responsible for the crime. The courts treat a
defendant's sleep-induced mayhem the same way they deal with
Pete's drug-induced mayhem-as the product of forces that over-
came the dominant character's legal sensibilities. Thus, both the
sleepwalker and Pete are released. Saks's analogy fails because the
same reasoning does not hold for an MPD sufferer, whose killer-
personality is just as robust and present as any other, more friendly
component. As previously noted, MPD sufferers do not have a
single dominant self, and neither do we, if Dennett's model is
accurate.
But even if the MPD sufferer could take advantage of an insanity
defense, there is a qualitative difference between her and a person
governed by our new model of consciousness that would prevent the
latter from avoiding legal blame. This difference is in the nature of
self-fragmentation in Saks's MPD victim and the person with our
brain-model. The MPD victim has several discrete personalities or
personality states, all of which are separated by an "amnesia
barrier." One alter usually has no knowledge of the others, and
many MPD sufferers initially come for treatment complaining not
of their actual condition, but of "blackout" periods, where they
"wake up" involved in some activity of which they have no memo-
ry. s3 In addition, each personality has its own extremely distinct
characteristics, often being different-handed, or even wearing
glasses with differing prescriptions.3 3 4  The alters have already-
scripted outlooks and agendas that do not change composition.
The neuron-states of Dennett's model share none of these
qualities. The coalitions that might create consciousness are of
limitless combination,33 5 as subsystems group and regroup in
response to environmental stimuli and a host of other factors. More
importantly, we do not have consciousness gaps-all neuronal
coalitions share in a common neurobiological memory storage, thus
29, 29-31 (1951).
333 See Saks, supra note 316, at 397-98. One can easily envision a scenario in which
one person seeks out two psychologists-one while under a certain personality, and
the other while under another personality. The MPD victim would be unaware of the
repetition.
33 Id. at 396.
35 If coalitions of neuron-structures were not variable, we could not account for
the breadth of our psychological experience. We touched on a similar point in our
discussion of Fodor: that limitless thoughts could only be created if recombinable
subparts, or symbols, were used. See supra note 193.
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allowing for experiential continuity. The average human being
could not claim to have "blacked out" and then killed someone.
The smooth readjustments of our neuron processes allow us
continuity of thought, thus barring use of an insanity defense.
It appears that analysis of Multiple Personality Disorder will not
give us a clear rationale for assigning blame to our new person, one
with an ever-adapting virtual machine for consciousness, and no
unitary self. Indeed, another distinction between MPD and
Dennett's model is that while MPD sufferers have competing
influences that can be considered distinct personalities, or even
persons, 3 6 we do not. Our prior description of neuron combina-
tions as "subselves" may have been misleading. Those groupings do
not have the depth of their MPD counterparts-no distinct handed-
ness, eyeglass prescription, emotional disposition, or other person-
like traits. They are more accurately described as computer
programs, with both the utility and superficiality that term implies.
Unfortunately, re-presenting the picture this way leads us to the
conclusion that instead of dealing with the legal responsibility of a
fragmented self, we are attempting to assign blame to bodies
containing no recognizable "selves" at all. This interpretation of
Dennett's model is probably the more accurate one,3 37 and leaves
us with a completed analogy between humanity and machinery.
As the next section will elaborate, there is a way finally to assign
moral responsibility to a human machine33 8 consisting of various
neuronal programs. Making a legal structure based on eliminativ-
336 See Saks, supra note 316, at 403-09.
337 Remember that Dennett considers the self an abstraction. See supra note 311
and accompanying text. He would agree with our revised assessment.
338 Note that the machine description does not itself force us to forego
assignments of blame. Machine-like explanations of human action, or "mechanism,"
and rationality can coexist:
[F]rom any particular mechanistic explanation of a bit of behavior it would
not follow that that particular bit of behavior was or was not a rational
response to the environmental conditions at the time, for the mere fact that
the response had to follow, given its causal antecedents, casts no more doubt
on its rationality than the mere fact that the computer had to answer "108"
[as the product of 18 and 6] casts doubt on the arithmetical correctness of
its answer.
Dennett, supra note 244, at 173. We tend, intuitively, to excuse behavior for which
we know the cause. Since machines are "causal devices" made up of parts and
processes, it may seem as though no responsibility is possible. As Moore points out,
we often think "tout comprendre clest toutpardonner"-to understand all is to forgive all.
Moore, supra note 36, at 1092. This fallacy is explored by Moore extensively in his
critique of causal theorists. See id. at 1112-48.
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ism a possibility entails acceptance of a broadened definition of
responsibility. If personal responsibility becomes synonymous with
"team" responsibility, the elements of a body's neurological system
can be collectively blamed for the actions of any subparts.
b. Collective Responsibility
An expanded conception of responsibility will allow us to blame
coherently persons whose consciousness is actually a parade of
neuronal coalitions. There is no need to discriminate a blamable
self from the background of shifting brain activity. Long-standing
legal doctrines provide essential clues to how this can be done:
certain legal practices will simply blame persons linked to a criminal
act but innocent of its actual commission. Accomplice liability
"'extends to acts of the principal in the first degree which were a
"natural and probable consequence" of the criminal scheme the
accomplice encouraged or aided.'" 33 9 Participation in a conspira-
cy will also justify blaming those who did not commit the underlying
criminal act. A person who agrees with others to assist in the
planning or commission of a crime may be legally responsible for it
if any conspirator commits an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
340
These doctrines evolved from our tendency to assign groups of
persons a singular identity, and to identify ourselves with a larger
collective in certain situations. For example, every player on a
baseball team
is likely to use the first person plural pronoun in speaking about
the team's victories or defeats, even if he did not participate in the
game .... By doing so, the player fully inhabits his role as a
member of the team.... The actions of other individuals in their
capacity as team members become one of the ways in which the particular
player authors objects and events. By talking about the victory as
"our" victory, the player experiences and enacts what may be
called the "collective moment": he subscribes as an author to an event
... whose intelligibility ... depends on the existence of a number of
similarly situated individuals.
3 4 1
339 Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARv. L. REV.
959, 988 (1992) (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, JR., HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW § 6.8, at 588 (2d ed. 1986) (footnote omitted)).340 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(l)(b)(5).
341 Dan-Cohen, supra note 339, at 986 (emphasis added).
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The group activity can develop characteristics that are not assign-
able to an individual member. As one commentator has quipped,
"[t]he charge on San Juan Hill ... is more than a number of men
racing up an incline behind a myopic horseman." 342 An orchestra
provides a clearer example: I may only be playing the violin, but
the entire group is playing Beethoven's Ninth. I have responsibili-
ties as an individual, but I also have responsibilities as a member of
an orchestra.
s43
Legal theories of corporate responsibility further illustrate the
potential shift from individual to collective blame. For example,
some commentators question the practice of holding corporations
criminally liable,344 since a "corporation" is nothing more than
a fiction, an aggregate of individuals in a specific economic
condition. Corporations per se, however, do share many character-
istics with natural persons that enable them to be deemed "persons"
and blamed for bad acts. The key element is to determine the
appropriate features shared by legal persons, which seem to be
capacities such as rational moral choice more than any biological
criteria.3 45 As noted previously, an individual is not punished as
a full legal person if she cannot think rationally. Like natural
persons, corporations arguably have this capacity to make reason-
able choices, in that they "choose" between various business
strategies and policies. These decisions are not made by any one
individual within the organization, and the final choice may not be
that which would have been chosen by a single biological decision-
maker.346  The obvious (and folk-psychological) objection to
likening corporations to biological beings is that while humans
actually have propositional attitudes enabling them to exhibit
rational choice, corporations can only pretend to possess them.347
We have seen, however, that the attribution of beliefs and desires
342 Thomas R. Flynn, Collective Responsibility and Obedience to the Law, 18 GA. L.
REv. 845, 846 (1984).
34 See id. at 846-47. Professor Dan-Cohen gives the example of nationality. See
Dan-Cohen, supra note 339, at 987. For example, to be an American is to bear
responsibility for specific acts far removed from personal experience, such as the
Vietnam War or the space shuttle explosion. Each individual citizen may feel shame
or pride with regard to these types of momentous events.
44 See, e.g., MEIR DAN-COHEN, PERSONs, RIGHTS AND ORGANIZATIONs 44 (1986);
John Keeley, Organizations as Non-Persons, 15J. VALUE INQUIRY 149 (1981).
345 See Steven Walt & William S. Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn't Matter: Corporate
Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 18 AM.J. CRIM. L. 263, 269-70 (1991).
346 See id. at 270.
347 See id.
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to humans is a fiction in itself, enabling us to simply codify and
explain enormously complex neurophysiological workings. The
modern legal conception of corporate liability merely places a
similar mask over the mechanics of the corporate structure, and
there is no reason why competing intracorporate forces and
competing neuronal coalitions cannot both be blamable as groups
generating aggregate decisions.
48
It is here we find the kernel of an answer to the problem of
assigning blame to people without a unitary mind or self. If the
concept of collective responsibility is readily applied to groups of
distinct persons, it is even more easily assigned to groups of
neurons. Each neuronal coalition is, by definition, linked to a
whole, unless the person suffers from MPD or another disorder
affecting her continuity of thought. An integral part of all subsys-
tems' "identities" is their existence as processes within a single body,
despite competition with other subsystems and lack of a single
coordinator. Every possible coalition is a member of the "team"
constituting person X. Thus our cerebral subprocesses acquire "the
social identity.., that can serve as an individual responsibility base
for the group's collective endeavors," 349 much like Dan-Cohen's
baseball player. Substitute the "body's" collective endeavors for the
"group's" above, and we are well on our way to justifying assign-
ments of blame to bodies without identifiable selves. The "social
fact"350 of collective responsibility is readily envisioned as a
biological phenomenon, by which separate brain structures are
"synthetically enriched" 51 by their relation to other structures,
548 Walt and Laufer point out that natural persons will sometimes act as "loosely
allied decision making units," giving the impression of multiple selves:
[S]ometimes, for some decisions, individuals are like small collectivities....
... An individual may adopt strategies intended to limit or preclude
choices which otherwise would be made later. An earlier self is strategically
manipulating a later self. This can be directly, through pre-commitment, or
indirectly, through institutional devices.
Id. at 271-72 (footnotes omitted).
349 Dan-Cohen, supra note 339, at 986.
350 Flynn, supra note 342, at 846. A social fact refers to an essential social
ensemble. In this instance, it is the fact that individual practices and events are made
more significant by their place in a complex network of social interactions and
history.
351 Id. (quotingJEAN-PAUL SARTRE, CRITIQUE OF DIALECTIcAL REASON 378 (Alan
Sheridan-Smith trans., 1976)).
1993] 1559
1560 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 141:1471
which in combination become an identifiable collective susceptible
to blame.
V. BETWEEN HERE AND THERE: POSSIBLE OUTCOMES AND THE
LAW'S ATrITUDE TOWARD NEUROSCIENTIFIC CHANGE
The above proposals require further elaboration, but the ideas
presented are meant to demonstrate that legal doctrine can begin
to accommodate eliminativist ideas and remain understandable. An
eliminative future may be a bit strange, but with a rationale for
maintaining moral blameworthiness, it can now be possible.
Eliminative materialists make a case for the demise of mental
state psychology, and I have made suggestions for filling the legal
gaps. If common-sense notions are to be cast aside, a more
impressive explanatory framework is required to maintain a just
legal system. Perhaps this framework will be "design-oriented," in
that it will rely on our Dennett-like picture of neurobiological
processes, leading to an eliminative legal system treating the human
as a complex machine. Another possibility is the use of the
character theory of responsibility, which would assign responsibility
based on the collective character expressed by succeeding neuronal
coalitions.
But predictions are hazardous, since no one can know what
neuroscience will uncover. Churchland bravely speculates concern-
ing social changes in communicative processes, learning capabilities,
and the like,3 52 but supportable suggestions cannot be made
without further empirical evidence. With Libet and Dennett we
have looked as far ahead as we can without relying on completely
unsupportable assumptions. One firm conclusion is that if the
eliminative materialists are correct in declaring folk psychology
radically false, a progressive attempt to reform legal codes based on
available neuroscientific information can only lead to more just
dispensations of moral blame. Dresser imagines a murder trial in
which a "mentalometer" is used to retrieve crucial neuronal residue
from the defendant's brain, in order to establish accurately the
nature of her culpability, 353 however that culpability is assessed in
a world free of beliefs and desires. Under Dennett's model, the
defendant is presumably blamed for the "bad" neuronal drafting
and redrafting traced by Dresser's device, which resulted in an
352 See Churchland, supra note 6, at 84-88.
353 See Dresser, supra note 2, at 27.
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output that caused an illegal act. We cannot know if this is a
realistic proposal, but Dresser has the right idea. The potential
legal benefits of tapping the innermost processes of the brain are
enormous. A new, sophisticated knowledge of the dynamics of
human cognition and behavior could only add credibility to legal
pronouncements. What makes contemplation of the changes
exciting is that while the benefits may be great, such a new system
will probably look nothing like the one we have today.
None of the changes we have discussed will occur overnight. If
folk psychology is to become obsolete, this realization will happen
only gradually. Development of a neuroscience able to handle the
complex evidentiary questions of the criminal law will arise more
quickly, but not rapidly enough to require abrupt, systemic
alterations within the legal system. There are a few basic paths the
future may take concerning scientific progress and the criminal law.
A. We Hit a Dead End
There is the possibility that we will never uncover evidence
dispositive of the question of whether mental state psychology is
radically false. Baker, who could not conceive of the elimination of
belief, 54 and Davidson, who asserted that psychological and
biological systems require explanations so different that they are
irreconcilable, 55 are representative of this approach. If we are
able to convince ourselves of the irreducibility of mental states, we
have, a fortiori, removed any problem.
This is not likely to occur. The distinct nature of eliminativism
is its marriage to hard science, and scientific research is not likely
to stop anytime soon. The chances of uncovering some neural
phenomenon "closing the book" on questions of mental state
psychology are exceedingly slim. If such a finding is not made, the
eliminative materialists will continue to gain ground, since the
search for a substitute will be continual.
354 See supra note 194.
355 See supra note 172.
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B. We Answer the Question
Another possibility is that further research will vindicate folk
psychology as an accurate representation of underlying neurophysio-
logical processes. This is the aforementioned identity theory, which
looked to biological correlates for mental states.35 6  Like the
possibility that we decide mental states are irreducible, such a
development would allow us to forego legal reforms. As our
discussion has shown, however, it may already be too late for this
option. What we know of the brain today is enough to destroy the
myth of Cartesian materialism, and neurodiagnostic equipment has
not yet revealed identifiable biological correlates for the phenomena
of folk psychology. The content problem also continues to plague
folk-psychological explanations. Finally, it was previously noted that
proving common-sense psychology accurate through neurobiological
findings would constitute an enormous coincidence. Folk psycholo-
gy is quite old, and combined with the content problem, a good
argument can be made for its extinction, alongside Aristotelian
physics and flat-Earth theories.
357
C. The Legal Attitude Toward Gradual Neuroscientific Change
Barring the luck required for either of the outcomes above, the
law will have to adopt a stance toward neuroscientific change. One
option is to ignore studiously the developments of neuroscience and
rely on the legal system as it currently exists. If those developments
were felt to threaten the moral order severely, such a position would
not be unjustifiable. Consider Libet: No matter how solidly one
supports his findings of unconscious initiation of voluntary actions,
very few of us can fully comprehend the idea of a human being not
being the conscious initiator of acts her body performs. As
importantly, most persons would consider Libet's conclusions
singularly undesirable. Almost one hundred years ago, William
James declared:
If a certain formula for expressing the nature of the world violates
my moral demand, I shall feel as free to throw it overboard, or at
least to doubt it, as if it disappointed my demand for uniformity
of sequence, for example: the one demand being, so far as I can
see, quite as subjective and emotional as the other is.
358
356 See supra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
357 Churchland, Dennett, and Baker are in agreement that scientific explorations
will not vindicate folk psychology. See Dresser, supra note 2, at 34.
358 MOORE, supra note 21, at 488 n.33 (quoting WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL TO
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James's position would require some kind of social contract in
which the law openly ignores the obsolescence of mental state
psychology in favor of a system of blame-assignment in keeping with
society's entrenched views on behavior and morality. But when
profound neuroscientific discoveries are made, this stance will
damage the credibility of the criminal law, since it may not properly
reflect what we then know of human behavior. If a convincing
redescription that is devoid of psychological pretensions can be
developed for the law and its mechanics, the "credibility problem"
may never arise at all, but we have seen that this path is rife with
potential pitfalls.
The law, being large and unwieldy, will most likely muddle its
way into an awkward compromise position. Scientific discoveries
below a certain level of significance will be ignored, while those of
sufficient credibility, profundity, and notoriety will eventually be
reflected in our legal scheme. The historical development of several
insanity tests is a lucid example of the law coming to terms with
confusing "psychological" phenomena,359 and the controversy
surrounding that effort probably foreshadows further legal-scientific
tussles in response to neurophysiological advances. An implicit
threshold of acceptability may even be in place today, as the courts
accept or reject certain biology-based criminal defenses.3 60  An
analysis of the factors controlling such decisions would reveal the
intricacies of a legal view toward science.
It is unlikely that a formal policy agenda will be instituted with
regard to legal adaptation of scientific advances. As has been the
case historically, the law will suffer blow by scientific blow, beating
a stubborn retreat until it finds itself at a point very different from
the one at which it began. It was mentioned at the outset that this
incremental evolution is the hallmark of a common law that
maintains the stability of society through only gradual alterations.
There is no reason to believe that this will not continue, with a
steady infusion of neurobiological input slowly molding the law to
its contours. Although the eliminativists may succeed in erasing the
BELIEVE 147 (1898)). One wonders whether James could have guessed what brain
science would show us. If he were confronted with the profundity of the changes we
contemplate, would it solidify his resolve, or prompt him to change his opinion?
359 See DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 289, 299-304.
360 See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. Consider Robert Alton Harris,
executed despite apparently suffering from "organic brain damage." See Harris v.
Vasquez, 943 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1275 (1992).
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folk-psychological facade and its legal manifestations, that victory
will entail a long and arduous process of legal stubbornness
combatting scientific progress.
CONCLUSION
Here ends the tour. This Comment has presented the law in
light of its psychological assumptions and explored the neuroscien-
tific progress that threatens them. The struggle between folk
psychology and eliminative materialism has been analyzed in an
effort to evaluate the credibility of each, and we are left with a few
disturbing changes and some educated guesses. In this cognitive-
philosophical realm, open-mindedness is a requirement. Humanity
has reached the threshold of resolving a few of the Big Questions,
and the answers to those questions may not comport with present
practice, legal or otherwise. The proposals suggested here are
controversial, but what is indisputable is that there are cherished
assumptions humanity has nourished in ignorance for thousands of
years; generations of forebearers made them a part of us, and we
resist their decline with hostility and fear. Society and its legal
system must soon confront these assumptions, either in response to
the eliminative materialists or other challengers that will surely
follow. We can have no idea what further biological truths
humanity will uncover, but their discovery is an adventure for
philosophers, scientists, legal theorists, and the rest of us alike.
